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IV I  
ABSTRACT 
The Russian petroleum industry is facing a critical juncture where expedient 
reform is necessary immediately. The main focus of this thesis is to account for 
the primary barriers which hamper the free flow of former Soviet petroleum into 
international markets and to suggest alternatives to current Russian energy policy. 
A secondary objective is to scrutinize the United States' foreign policy with respect 
to the possibility of influencing the augmentation of world petroleum supplies. 
Preliminary indications suggest that confidence-building measures have been slowly 
introduced by the Yeltsin administration, but the positive effects have not yet been 
felt by the petroleum industry. International investment within the Russian 
petroleum industry has been sluggish at best. Transnational oil companies continue 
to be reluctant to invest in Russia and the former Soviet Union due to political and 
economic uncertainty and the high risk of capital loss. The future of the Russian 
petroleum industry appears promising provided the major barriers (e.g., tax codes, 
presidential decrees, pipeline construction and maintenance, and capital investment) 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The current lack of former Soviet oil and gas revenues 
preclude economic security without the solvency of various 
barriers which impede interstate and international trade. The 
Russian political bureaucracy is at odds with the newly 
independent states over petroleum rights and the persistence by 
transnational oil corporations to exploit the massive known 
reserves outside of the Russian Federation.  In addition, the 
process of gaining international oil contracts has been sluggish 
due to unfair tax codes, revenue-sharing disparities, continuing 
deterioration of interstate relations, and the high cost of 
initial capital for drilling and infrastructure (oil transport 
and pipeline construction).1 
The confidence-building mechanisms necessary for economic 
opportunity are lacking throughout the former Soviet union (FSU). 
The oil-producing states of the FSU demand independent markets 
and international assistance without Moscow's bureaucratic 
intervention. Revenues from oil and gas are the single most 
important resource or commodity which has prevented the collapse 
of the Russian economy since the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Currently, oil accounts for 60 percent of all Russian export 
revenues.2 The former Soviet oil-producing states need revenues 
^ill Javetski, "Why Soviet Oil Wells Won't Be Gushing 
Soon", Business Week, September 9, 1991, 36-38. 
2Howard Banks, "The Land of a Thousand Leaks", Forbes, July 
8, 1991, 35. 
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for continued independence and to supplant Russian economic 
influence.  I consider Moscow's control of oil revenues as a key 
economic indicator of the future success or the continued 
deterioration of the state. 
In this thesis, details which hinder economic growth within 
the former Soviet Union will be examined relative to oil 
production and consumption along with those details which permit 
Russia to exploit their neighbors for national benefit. The 
objective of this thesis is to account for a number of the major 
barriers which hamper the free flow of former Soviet oil into 
international markets and to suggest alternatives to Russian 
energy policy. A secondary objective is to examine a progressive 
U.S. foreign policy capable of augmenting world petroleum 
supplies (with an emphasis on Russian petroleum exports) .  The 
current situation requires the utmost scrutiny by the United 
States and the introduction of measures for the continued peace 
and economic security of the post-communist states of the Soviet 
Union3. 
3Note:  Throughout this thesis the terms FSU and former 
Soviet Union will be used interchangeably to refer to that entity 
or geographical area that existed after August 1991 which 
consists of the former boundaries of the USSR.  This entity has 
no political, economic, or military empowerment or decision 
authority.  It refers only to a geographical region.  The CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) will refer to the federation 
of independent states within the FSU starting in 1991 (excluding 
the Baltic states and Moldova) which work together under common 
rules of government but have independent governmental bodies. 
USSR and Soviet Union will refer to the political, economic, and 
military state which existed between 1917-1991.  The use of the 
term Russia will refer to the state prior to 1917 or the Russian 
Federation from 1991 to the present. 
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II.  RUSSIAN PETROLEUM SINCE THE 
DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
A.  OIL AND GAS CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION, AND RESERVES 
The petroleum industry in Russia and the other former Soviet 
states is in a critical state. The problems resulting with the 
decline of this industry can be attributed to many factors, but 
the most significant is the lack of production and exploration 
which ensures invaluable monetary resources for a declining 
economy. The Soviet Union was the world's leading petroleum 
producer as little as six years ago with nearly 12.5 million 
barrels of oil produced per day. Today, that figure is less than 
7.0 million barrels per day4. When taking into consideration 
that over 60 percent of all Russian export revenues in 1995 are 
attributed to the sale of petroleum and petroleum products, it is 
apparent that the Russian economy is dependent upon the 
international market for survival. The fall in the Russian 
Federation's petroleum production is greater than the production 
of any OPEC country with the exception of Saudi Arabia.  The 
magnitude of this crisis (almost 50 percent decline in petroleum 
production) is far greater than any petroleum analysts ever 
anticipated.  Russia along with the other former Soviet states 
can and must return its crude and condensate production to 12 - 
12.5 million barrels per day. This will only be possible through 
4Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, Russia 2010: And What 
it Means for the World (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 245. 
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improved management and hard currency investment within the 
petroleum sector. 
In order to understand the significance of the major changes 
in world production and consumption, statistics must be analyzed 
from the late 1980's up to the present day.  The comparative 
decline in production and the increase in consumption for most 
major industrial nations would appear to be setting a trend of 
increasing dependence on third world petroleum reserves. For the 
following analysis, I will mainly focus on oil since it still 
accounts for three-quarters of the total volume of world trade in 
energy5.  Initially though, a brief historical account of the 
Soviet Union's oil industry may help to shed light and better 
understand what may lie ahead. 
At the turn of the century, Russia was the leading oil 
producer in the world, accounting for half of the world total. 
By 1921, production had fallen to 30 percent of the peak set in 
1901.  The decline was triggered by labor disputes and armed 
uprisings in the Baku region. A similar situation exists today, 
but now triggered by ethnic conflict. 
Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Western oil 
interest in Russia was considerable.  On June 1, 1918, the oil 
industry was nationalized and all of the Western interests were 
expropriated.  Baku fell back into the hands of Turkey in 1920. 
The Bolshevik forces, victorious in the civil war, regained 
5J.E. Hart shorn, Oil Trade:  Politics and Prospects 
[Cambridge, MA:  Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 35 
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control of Baku and once again the oil properties were 
nationalized without indemnification. 
With nationalization, the history of the czarist oil 
industry was now at a close. The oil industry remained 
socialized, the state took on decisions that once were the 
prerogative of the private businessman. From that time forward, 
the Soviet oil industry moved along lines dictated by successive 
five-year plans. Supply exceeded demand in the years running up 
to the beginning of World War II. As a percentage of oil 
production, oil exports in the mid-1920's to the mid-1930*s were 
comparable to those percentages of the 1970's and 1980's. 
Production fell dramatically during World War II, as a 
result of the enemy occupation and the transfer to the east of 
prospecting and drilling crews. The shift eastward proved 
successful with the discovery of the Urals-Volga oil fields, 
which carried the country, in terms of oil supply, through the 
1960's. By that time, substantially richer finds had been 
discovered in the inhospitable lands of Western Siberia. 
The explosion in oil production, as the new West Siberian 
oil fields came on stream, was unmatched by those of Baku. 
Between 1970 and 1980, Soviet production rose by more than 5 
million barrels per day.  The export of oil grew concomitantly 
from some 1.9 million barrels per day in 1970 to 3.3 million 
barrels per day by 1980. More significantly, hard currency 
earnings from such exports expanded much faster, from less than 
$390 million in 1970 to in excess of $12.1 billion in 1980. This 
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obviously reflects the sharp jump in world prices emerging from 
the 1973-74 oil crisis. 
The Central Intelligence Agency prepared a report for 
President Carter entitled The International Energy Situation: 
Outlook to 1985 which was released in April 1977.  This 
particular report foresaw world oil demand substantially 
exceeding supply by 1985.  Prices would rise sharply in order to 
distribute available supplies. All this would take place if 
energy conservation were not greatly increased. A section of 
this report concluded that the Soviet Union would find itself not 
only unable to supply oil to Eastern Europe and the West on the 
then present scale but also having to compete for OPEC oil for 
its own use. 
What was the rational grasped by the CIA in 1977 behind 
declining Soviet oil production? It was much the same then as it 
is now:  the failure to find and develop new oil fields to 
replace declining production at mature areas; emphasis on 
developmental drilling at the expense of exploration drilling; 
and water incursion of the production wells.  It was concluded 
that the initial falloff, when it comes, would almost certainly 
be sharp and may continue to fall sharply.  This has occurred, 
but it has been ten years later than expected. 
The current loss in Russian oil export capability may be 
mitigated in part by lower domestic requirements.  The reduction 
of economic activity has brought about considerably higher prices 
for fuels; the downward trend will continue until international 
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investment is sought within all economic sectors. Why should we 
continually speculate about the ability of the former Soviet 
Union to export oil? First, we care about the level of former 
Soviet oil exports because further declines in such exports will 
give OPEC more direct control over the world oil market. 
Secondly, the former Soviet Union must be able to earn hard 
currency if it is to meet its foreign debt obligations, and to 
present some semblance of credit-worthiness to bankers and 
foreign governments. Thirdly, the development of sources of oil 
outside the United States and away from the Persian Gulf would be 
responsive to one of the major elements of our National Energy 
Strategy.  It is for these reasons that the U.S. made the 
judgement (in our National Energy Strategy) that a healthy 
Russian oil and gas industry is in our longer-term political and 
economic interests6. 
What has gone wrong with the Russian oil industry? New 
wells stand idle because shortages of steel pipe have prevented 
the construction of oil gathering systems.  Older wells have been 
shut down for lack of spare parts.  Pipelines burst because of 
initial poor construction practices and because regular 
inspection is being ignored. Water is overwhelming the producing 
fields.  Oil refineries are badly outmoded by Western standards, 
lagging perhaps 15 years or so in terms of technical innovation. 
6Hazel R. O'Leary, Department of Energy Strategic Plan, 
April 1994, p. 16. 
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---- ----------------------------------------_ ..... 
New oil discoveries are small in size and fall far short of 
replenishing oil supplies. 
Should world demand grow along anticipated lines and if 
Iraqi oil remains off the market, the continued collapse of the 
Soviet oil industry and the parallel withdrawal of its oil from 
the world market will test OPEC.  Indeed, it may be considered 
that certain OPEC member-countries are planning for just that 
circumstance, as they work to expand producing capacity and to 
market increased volumes in their search for additional income. 
Constraints in domestic oil supply raises the prospect that 
those newly independent states, such as the Baltics and the 
Ukraine, all heavily dependent on imports to fuel their 
economies, may increasingly turn to suppliers in the Middle East. 
It is likely that some Middle East oil will flow to these 
consumers, but Russia will most likely remain the dominant 
supplier. 
We now have to consider, in the context of energy supply and 
demand, the meaning of Ukrainian independence.  Because export 
oil and gas pipelines transit the Ukraine enroute from Russia to 
Eastern and Western Europe, that places a powerful weapon in the 
hands of the Ukrainians.  That weapon (closure of the pipelines) 
need never be used, but the potential impact of its use is always 
there.  Think what closure of these lines, for perhaps political 
purposes, might mean for Russia, for Eastern and Western Europe, 
and for world oil prices. 
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The division of socialist labor in the Soviet Union meant 
that one republic (Azerbaidzhan) would concentrate on the 
manufacture of oil field equipment, while another (Uzbekistan) 
would be the center for the growing of cotton. Thus, no one 
republic truly was economically independent, although the Russian 
Republic came the closest simply because of its geographic size 
and diversity.  What will this mean in terms of equipment 
availability, labor, and technical expertise for the oil 
industry? 
This division of labor did not work well at all under the 
old regime; and because it did not, the fragmentation of the 
former Soviet Union will not hold the adverse conditions it 
might, had the situation been otherwise.  Indeed, if anything, it 
may well cause the former republics to recognize that they need 
one another as much now as they did before7. 
If your own means are limited, as they are for the former 
Soviet Union, then the natural recourse would be to look abroad 
for help; thus, the rational for joint ventures. Joint ventures 
offered to date generally involve the development of known but 
complex oil deposit recovery, a task which presently is beyond 
the host country's capability; or a joint venture may involve the 
rehabilitation of a producing field through horizontal drilling 
7An historical account transcribed from a hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Power during the first session of the 
102nd Congress(HR), December 11, 1991. Mr. Robert E. Ebel, Vice 
President, International Affairs Ensearch Corporation was the 
speaker. The subject matter included oil and the former Soviet 
Union, pp. 50-56. 
he i i  f cialist r   oviet ni  eant 
t e bli  zerbai an) oul  ncentrat    
anufactur  f il  i ent, hil  ot er zbekist ) 
oul    t r r  i  f tt . hus,  e 
bli   as o icall  endent, h   ussi  
epubli  rne  l s st pl  s  f  gr hi   
 i ersit . hat ill i  ea  s f i ent 
ailabilit , r,  i al perti   il 
st  
hi  i i f r i  t or  ell t ll er  
l  e; s  i t, a entat f 
er viet ni ill t l er dit  
ight, u o t ise. , t i ,
a ell er bli i t
t r uc i f r •
r ea s i it , r
viet ni n, t r l r oul
l ; s, o l t t r s. i t t r
t eral n o ent t
pl il osit r , ~ hi t
st ntr ' abilit ;  t t a n
bili io  e hrou ri t l in
7  l t ran ib rom  
mi t er o
ngr ), e ber , . r. bert . el, i
t, o l ff i s r orat h
er. j t att n lud i h orm i t
ni , . .
9 
or work-overs, or through the application of secondary and 
tertiary recovery methods. 
Presuming the removal of all obstacles, permitting the broad 
involvement both sides seek, would successful joint ventures with 
Western oil companies allow the Soviet oil industry to halt its 
decline, and return to previous output and export levels? With 
the U.S. becoming less attractive for exploration, exploration 
dollars are flowing overseas in greater numbers.  In the 1980s 
these dollars found their way to China, but with little success 
in terms of volumes of oil found. Now, these dollars are 
pointing their way towards the former Soviet Union.  Yet, just 
some 50 joint ventures have been registered in the oil industry 
to date, of which 16 are functioning.  But only two joint 
ventures have actually reached the stage where crude oil has 
become available to the foreign partner for export, (Tengiz Field 
exploited by Chevron and Volgograd Fields exploited by Nationale 
Elf Aquitaine from France).  Why the delay?  If the oil companies 
are wanted and needed by the former Soviet oil-producing states, 
and if the companies in turn are anxious to get going, then 
something must be wrong.  Indeed, there is a problem. 
In July 1993, those major U.S. oil companies interested in 
doing business in the former Soviet Union participated in a U.S.- 
Russia Energy Roundtable, held in Moscow8.  The purpose of the 
Energy Roundtable was to clarify those obstacles which, in the 
8Stephen Blank, Energy and Secuity in Transcaucasia 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, Army War 
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minds of the oil companies present, precluded them from going 
ahead with plans to invest.  Strong reference was made to the 
need that the rate of return should be commensurate with the 
risks and difficulties involved, and be competitive with other 
opportunities elsewhere in the world. 
Taxes were too high and complicated. Multiple forms of 
business structures were desirable, as each investor and each 
project has a different need. The right to freely export at 
market prices and retain proceeds of sales and profits abroad 
were critical.  Internal sales should be made at international 
market prices, with remuneration in convertible currency. But 
this listing omitted one very key concern: who are the real 
decision-makers in the Russian Federation? That concern still 
exists. The same conundrum faces the U.S. government: with whom 
to negotiate, to sign treaties, to carry on those working 
relationships normally expected between sovereign states? 
Much has been said as to what actions Russia must take, if 
it is to attract Western investment. Above all, there must be in 
place a comprehensive legal framework covering business activity. 
The currency must be convertible. A sound financial system is 
also a necessity. And wrapped around all this, there must be the 
cloak of stability. 
The role of the U.S. in helping foster an acceptable 
investment climate in the former Soviet Union is quite limited. 
The burden rests with the Russian side, and will continue to do 
so. Oil companies are accustomed to operating in sometimes 
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hostile political and economic environments.  For the companies, 
it is not a matter of risk identification.  That is the easy 
part. Rather, the difficulty rests with risk management. 
Clearly, then, given the unsettled political and economic 
conditions now extant, the prospect of successful risk management 
becomes more uncertain. 
I would not anticipate any substantial impact from joint 
ventures on domestic supply until 1997 or so.  Under a majority 
of the joint ventures, half the oil belongs to the foreign 
partner, and will contribute nothing to meeting domestic 
requirements or to export capability. 
The USSR historically suffered from local fuel shortages, 
especially during the harvest season, for two reasons.  First, 
the distribution network was antiquated and could not cope with 
rising demand.  Second, the yield of light petroleum products 
such as gasoline, jet fuel and diesel fuel from Soviet refineries 
(at 62 percent capacity) , is much too low by modern standards. 
Now, however, a more precarious element has entered the picture. 
The former republics will be looking out for their own interests 
first, in the absence of a strong center. With shortages and 
rationing the order of the day, inter-state trade in fuel and 
energy has become politicized.  That means fuel deliveries, for 
example, can be withheld as a form of blackmail to induce another 
former republic to act in a way responsive to the desires of the 
seller.  That is happening today on a broadening scale.  One 
example comes immediately to mind.  The delivery of natural gas 
12 
sti li o i o ents. h panies,
t  att is d t . t h
rt. at er, h c i s anage ent.
~ h , h s t e li l i
it o w t t, h t ssf l s a a ent
or cert i .
 oul t t st ti l act rom t
t esti l til . nder  ajori
t t r s, l i g
rt r, ill t t t eeti esti
re t ort abilit .
i rom l l rt es,
ci l r r est , s. irst,
i ib io r as t l t it
sin and. d, i f t oleum ct
s li e, t l i l l ro viet r
t r t acity) uc o   oder r s. 
o , ever, or r r  ent s t   i t r . 
er bli ill  i  t i  t  
t, f ro  nter. it  rt   
io   r r f  , t    l  
 s e olit . hat eans l eli eri s, r
ple,   it el    f l ail   t er 
er bli   t  a si    esir  f  
ll r. hat  e i    r i  ale. ne
ple es ediatel   ind. he el  f at ral as 
 
from Azerbaidzhan to Armenia has been stopped because of ethnic 
disputes9. 
The disappearance of a strong center, an unprecedented 
collapse of political and economic institutions, with no hope for 
any early resuscitation - all make for a potentially very 
dangerous situation. Oil cannot be separated from this equation. 
Russia, which controls some 92 percent of oil production and 
refining of the former Soviet Union, most likely will be inclined 
to take advantage of its position when and where it can.  FSU 
oil-producing states, where the fuels and energy industries may 
stand on the brink of collapse, understandably become nervous, 
because both their political and economic postures then become 
vulnerable. Decisions taken will reflect that uneasiness, and 
the need to erase that vulnerability. 
The following statistics gives credence to the ever-changing 
international petroleum market. The changes in oil and gas 
production between 1989 and 1995 will be my focus since the 
dramatic changes to USSR, the former Soviet Union, and the United 
States with reference to petroleum production and consumption 
occurred during this time frame. The major oil producers in 1989 
according to million barrels of oil produced per day (mbd) were: 
(in descending order) (1) USSR, 12.60 mbd; (2) United States, 
8.70 mbd; (3) Saudi Arabia, 5.10 mbd; (4) Iran, 2.84 mbd; and (5) 
Mexico, 2.82 mbd.  These five countries accounted for almost 60 
percent of all oil produced in the world (of which OPEC produced 
9Blank, pp. 40-45. 
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34 percent of the world total) [see Table l]10.  The world order 
today with respect to oil production has changed dramatically for 
only a five year period.  The following countries were the major 
producers for calendar year 1994:  (1) Saudi Arabia, 8.00 mbd; 
(2) Commonwealth of Independent States, 7.03 mbd (of which Russia 
produced 6.60 mbd); (3) United States, 6.63 mbd; (4) Iran, 3.59 
mbd; and (5) China, 2.98 mbd [see Table 2]. These top five oil- 
producing countries accounted for 46 percent of the world total; 
a significant decrease from the figure given in 1989. While OPEC 
countries accounted for 34 percent of world oil production in 
1989, today they account for 40.80 percent of the world total. 
The rate of dependency upon OPEC for a majority of the oil 
reserves is quite apparent; and it should be alarming to those 
countries that depend on a majority of oil from the international 
market (e.g., the United States receives 40 percent of imported 
oil from OPEC, South East Asia receives almost 75 percent of its 
oil from Middle East OPEC countries)11. 
10
 J.E. Hart shorn, Oil Trade:  Politics and Prospects 
(Cambridge, MA:  Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 38. 
11Oil and Gas Journal, March 13, 1995, pp. 61 and 210. 
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TABLE 1.  OIL PRODUCTION 1989 
COUNTRY PRODUCTION (tribd) % OF WORLD PRODUCTION 
USSR 12.60 23.44% 
United States 8.70 16.18% 
Saudi Arabia 5.10 9.49% 
Iran 2.84 5.28% 
Mexico 2.82 5.25% 
OPEC 18.28 34.00% 
WORLD TOTAL 53.76 100.00% 
TABLE 2.  OIL PRODUCTION 1994 
COUNTRY PRODUCTION (iribd) % OF WORLD PRODUCTION 







United States 6.63 10.80% 
Iran 3.59 5.85% 
China 2.98 4.86% 
OPEC 25.04 40.80% 
WORLD TOTAL 61.37 100.00% 
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The demand by OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) countries for oil has increased anywhere from 
2.0 percent to 4.0 percent each year since 1989.  This trend 
appears to be the norm for the next few years.  Contrary to this 
trend, non-OECD countries have decreased demand and supply by 
almost the same percentage, but the former Soviet Union accounts 
for the major decline (50 percent) in supply and demand [ (FSU 
demand:  4.61 mbd; supply:  6.91 mbd; (1995 figures)].  Even 
though the FSU has had almost a 50 percent decline in production 
and consumption during this same period, the effects on the 
international markets has been negligible due to Russia's ability 
to continue exports at former levels.  The major concern within 
the international arena is the increasing dependency on OPEC oil 
as the prime source for OECD imports.  The U.S. does not 
necessarily depend on any specific region for oil, but we are 
concerned very much over the petroleum dependency for our 
strategic allies.  These countries (e.g., Japan, France, Italy, 
United Kingdom, etc.) import a majority of their oil from OPEC 
and specifically the Middle East12.  Any disruption of oil flow 
out of the Middle East could create a panic of world proportions. 
This also explains a great deal about U.S. military presence in 
this region. 
The top five natural gas producers in the world from 1989 to 
1995 have not changed in order (according to total production). 
They are as follows in terms of billion cubic feet (bcf) 
120il and Gas Journal, March 27, 1995, p. 61. 
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produced:  (1) Commonwealth of Independent States, 25,674 bcf (of 
which Russia accounts for 21, 823 bcf); (2) United States, 19,822 
bcf; (3) Canada, 5,855 bcf; (4) Netherlands, 2,772 bcf; and (5) 
United Kingdom, 2,540 bcf. These countries accounted for 73.5 
percent of the total world production.  The breakdown of world 
production percentages is as follows:  (1) CIS, 33.30 percent; 
(2) U.S., 25.70 percent; (3) Canada, 7.60 percent; (4) 
Netherlands, 3.60 percent; and (5) United Kingdom, 3.30 percent. 
All of these countries, except for the CIS, consumed almost their 
entire domestic production totals. The CIS exported almost 40 
percent to Western Europe [see Table 3]13. 
Each respective country has increased production output of 
3 percent on average during the past six years.  Conversely, oil 
production for the United States and the CIS has decreased by 23 
percent and 44 percent respectively.  It is quite evident that 
the relationship between oil and gas production, if it exists, 
has either affected the reversal production and consumption trend 
of one upon the other; or there is no relationship.  I would 
theorize that there is no relationship since consumption of oil 
versus gas has not changed irrespective of production ratios. 
"Natural gas figures utilized or interpreted from Oil and 
Gas Journal Statistics of March 14, 1994, p. 87 and March 13, 
1995, p. 110. 
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TABLE 3.  NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION 1995 







United States 19,822 25.70% 
Canada 5,855 7.60% 
Netherlands 2,772 3.60% 
United Kingdom 2,540- 3.30% 
OPEC 31,048 40.27% 
WORLD TOTAL 77,099 100.00% 
The impact of gas upon petroleum markets and international 
trade is increasing for the same reasons that it did much earlier 
for oil:  demand growth in traditional consuming areas and new 
demand in emergent markets, both increasingly separated 
geographically from the main sources of supply.  The world energy 
consumption in the last twenty years has increased by 38 percent. 
Surprisingly, estimated reserves and actual reserves had also 
increased by a similar percentage. Among fossil fuels during 
this period, natural gas has been the most dynamic energy source, 
with a growth of 65 percent versus 12 percent for oil and 28 
percent for coal.  In terms of market share, natural gas has 
grown from 19 percent to 23 percent in the past twenty years, 
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while oil has declined from 49 percent to 40 percent, and coal 
from 30 percent to 27 percent. 
The change within the consumer market cannot be compared to 
the actual reserves since world coal reserves are equal to 67 
percent of total fossil fuels, while oil reserves amount to 17 
percent and gas reserves 16 percent. Due to the lesser impact 
of gas exports upon the international markets, the reference to 
gas will be mainly the subject for analyzing the export potential 
for former Soviet Union gas reserves. Natural gas, unlike oil, 
is heading in a positive direction for most OECD countries. Due 
to the fact that the main producers are also the main consumers 
within OECD countries (with the exception of Japan and Germany) , 
the control of natural gas (or "the power factor") is negligible 
within the international market. The lack of export potential of 
Russian natural gas greatly affects the CIS's economic outlook 
and ultimately affects the primary importers of Eastern and 
Western Europe. 
The six year decline in oil production within the former 
Soviet Union will have dire consequences unless the trend is 
stopped. While current reserves are being exhausted, new 
reserves are not being prepared for production fast enough. 
During the 1980's the Soviet Union on average had shut-in 2-4 
percent of their wells. Today almost 31 percent of the wells are 
idle. As mentioned earlier, the lack of spending on exploration 
and the opening of new wells has hampered the Russian petroleum 
industry to the point of possible economic collapse. More than 
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70 percent of today's explored (proved plus probable) oil 
reserves are under development.  There is no sign of surplus 
reserves without technological assistance from the West 
(primarily the U.S.).  The curtailment of geological exploration 
on grounds that there is a lack of money will have a disastrous 
effect on oil production as far into the future as 1996-2000. 
According to the Oil and Gas Journal, it is time for the former 
Soviet Union to set aside revenues from the levy on oil and gas 
prices into a special account to finance geological 
exploration14. Due to the disestablishment of the Soviet 
geological ministry, revenues could be disbursed to other 
countries with the technological capability for enhanced 
recovery, advanced geological equipment, and horizontal drilling 
capabilities, but this is not the situation. 
Production figures for oil and gas are extremely significant 
if the only consideration is how much oil and gas is on the 
international market at a given point; and who is consuming the 
majority of the oil and gas at any given time frame? More 
importantly though, which country or countries have the most 
proven or probable petroleum reserves? This will indicate the 
potential for longevity within the petroleum market.  Some 
countries (e.g. the United States) produce a substantial amount 
of oil and gas (10.80 percent and 25.70 percent respectively in 
the world) but only account for a small proportion of the 
14Domenico Dispenza, Oil and Gas Journal, May 4, 1992, pp. 
44-45. 
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reserves  (U.S. possesses 2.40 percent of the world oil reserves 
and 3.30 percent of the world natural gas reserves). 
The top five oil reserves countries in the world are: (1) 
Saudi Arabia with 258.70 billion barrels accounts for 25.90 
percent of the world total and 33.50 percent of OPEC total 
reserves; (2) Iraq with 100.00 billion barrels accounts for 10.00 
percent of the world reserves; (3) Kuwait with 94.00 billion 
barrels accounts for 9.41 percent of world reserves; (4) Iran 
with 92.80 billion barrels accounts for 9.30 percent of world 
reserves; and (5) Abu Dhabi with 92.20 billion barrels accounts 
for 9.23 percent of world reserves. These five countries account 
for 63.80 percent of the total world oil reserves (999.00 billion 
barrels is total world oil reserves in 1995). OPEC accounts for 
77.30 percent of the total world oil reserves [see Table 4]15. 
Natural gas reserves like oil reserves are also concentrated 
in particular regions. The major problem with the exploitation 
of these reserves (with reference to the former Soviet Union) is 
the lack of a transportation network designed to reach 
international markets. Natural gas is slowly but surely 
supplanting the exports of oil. The wealth of petroleum within 
Russia and the former Soviet republics (natural gas accounting 
for 40 percent of the total world reserves) has the potential for 
creating a huge impact upon the international markets if oil 
reserves continue to be depleted at current rates. Various 
15
"Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production", Oil and Gas 
Journal, December 13, 1994, pp. 94-95. 
21 
. . s r t orl il
r t orl t r l  .
il ntri orl :
i ra i it . i io rr l nt .
r t orl l . r t l
s; it . i io rr l nt .
r t orl s; uwait it . i io
rr l nt r t orl s;
it . i io rr l nt r t orl
s; habi it . i io rr l nt
r t orl s. es ntri t
. r t l orl il . i io
rr l l orl il 5). nt
. r t l orl il a l 15.
atural k il centr t
rt l i s. aj r e it l it
it e r viet ni )
ra rt r
l arkets. atural o l t
l t ort il. ealt oleum it i
ussi r viet li t r l t
r t l orl t nti l
act l arket il
t l t r t . ari
15"World i t eser r ucti ", il a
r al e ber , 4, . - .
geological services have estimated that oil reserves could be 
depleted as early as 40-45 years from now (these estimates could 
be conservative since many undiscovered reserves still exist). 
TABLE 4.  OIL RESERVES 
COUNTRY , RESERVES 
(billions barrels) 
% OF WORLD RESERVES 
Saudi Arabia 258.70 25.90% 
Iraq 100.00 10.00% 
Kuwait 94.00 9.41% 
Iran 92.80 9.30% 
Abu Dhabi 92.20 9.23% 
OPEC 772.23 77.30% 
WORLD TOTAL 999.00 100.00% 
The top five natural gas reserve countries in the world are 
as follows:  (1) Commonwealth of Independent States, 1,997,000 
billion cubic feet (bcf) which accounts for 39.80 percent of the 
total world reserves, of which Russia accounts for 85 percent; 
(2) Iran, 730,000 bcf which accounts for 14.60 percent of the 
total world reserves; (3) Qatar, 250,000 bcf which accounts for 
5.00 percent of the total world reserves; (4) Saudi Arabia, 
185,360 bcf which accounts for 3.70 percent of the total world 
reserves; and (5) United States, 164,015 bcf which accounts for 
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3.30 percent of total world reserves. Unlike oil reserves, OPEC 
accounts for only 40.00 percent of all natural gas reserves which 
is still considerable by international standards [see Table 5]16. 
TABLE 5.  NATURAL GAS RESERVES 







Iran 730,000 14.60% 
Qatar 250,000 5.00% 
Saudi Arabia 185,360 3.70% 
United States 164,015 3.30% 
OPEC 2,020,448 40.00% 
WORLD TOTAL 5,016,213 100.00% 
Natural gas reserves are neither concentrated into any one 
region, nor are they as geographically removed from patterns of 
consumption, as those of oil. According to the aforemention 
figures on oil and gas production, consumption, and reserves, the 
anticipation of a correlation between total production of a given 
country and its reserves is many times just a fallacy which can 
only be explained through an analysis of supply and demand. The 
iß "Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production", Oil and Gas 
Journal, December 13, 1994, pp. 94-95. 
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degree of concentration of supply and demand are quite similar. 
The main consumers and producers (top 6 oil and gas producing 
countries) account for over half of each world total. These 
cores of demand and supply overlap, mainly because the U.S. and 
former Soviet Union were, until 1990, the world's largest oil 
consuming and producing countries.  The geographical dispersion 
of demand and supply outside the U.S. and USSR, in the postwar 
decades, was what generated most of the international oil trade. 
Today, neither country is isolated from this trade. The 
U.S. is the world's largest oil importer (net); the former Soviet 
Union is the second largest exporter (net).  The problems 
stemming from interdependency on petroleum are panoramic and 
touch almost all corners of the world.  Some are more dependent 
than others, but all depend on oil or gas for subsistence 
(whether it be for consumption or domestic capital flow from 
exports).  Economic growth within the industrialized and 
industrializing countries of the world is extremely reliant upon 
the oil and gas industry in order to bolster GDP and maintain a 
steady rate of industrialization. 
The world consumes 65 million barrels of oil daily.  Since 
geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable 
certainty that known reservoirs under existing economic and 
operating conditions are estimated at a trillion barrels of oil, 
there would apparently be just over 42 years of oil supplies left 
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in the world17. Will this in effect cause a crisis anytime 
within the near future? Most likely not, unless petroleum 
exports are interrupted by international conflict.  Only then, 
will alternative fuels be of critical nature (as the case was in 
the mid 1970's). For now, the question of world stability (in a 
political sense) takes precedence due to the challenge for a new 
world order. Time will be of essence for economic stability once 
this quest for political stability has been attained. Now is the 
time for an economic policy within the international realm to be 
established along the line of a World Trade Organization which 
considers the stability of a world ten, twenty, or thirty years 
into the future. 
Now consider the former Soviet Union, the world's second 
best prospective region for oil and gas development, as a haven 
for future petroleum prospects. After being shut out for several 
decades, Russia is gratified but also particularly reluctant (due 
to increasing nationalist tendencies) to draw Western companies 
technical expertise and capital into joint ventures to develop 
some of the largest newly available petroleum reserves available 
outside the Persian Gulf. Due to the immense differences between 
the Russian and OPEC oil, transnational petroleum companies 
prefer the exploitation of low-cost OPEC ("sweet") crude. On the 
other hand, the FSU provides a new frontier which contains many 
of the unknown reserves which entice those companies hoping to 
17J.E. Hartshorn, Oil Trade;  Politics and Prospects 
(Cambridge, MA.:  Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 37-41, 
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make it big.  Between OPEC and the FSU, no other oil provinces 
compare in terms of the volumes of known petroleum resources that 
can readily be brought towards production without further 
exploration. 
There are two possible reasons why technical costs in ex- 
Soviet oil might turn out to be lower than in some of the other 
non-OPEC frontier areas where international companies operate. 
The first is that the former Soviet Union can offer known fields 
already appraised, without exploration risks.  The second is that 
some of these are super-giants (over 1 billion barrels reserve), 
with fairly high well productivity. Most of these are remote 
even from Russian centers of consumption, often with high 
transport costs overland for internal consumption as well as to 
export terminals. 
Apart from oil prospects, new ventures in the gas trade both 
within OPEC and the FSU may, by the turn of the century, offer 
participation on a scale not previously known. Gas is the favored 
energy source of the next few decades.  It is moving in the 
direction to supplement and replace other fossil fuels in power 
generation (another reason for the significance of the FSU's 40 
percent share of world reserves). As a highly convenient general 
fuel, it is becoming available in more regions, and able to meet 
what ever prices are charged for oil products. Gas seems certain 
to take over much of the market share that non-OPEC oil will 
eventually relinquish. Much of the additional gas consumption 
will move through international trade.  Part of it will come from 
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OPEC countries, but not necessarily from all the main crude 
producers. At the very least, gas will diversify the sources of 
petroleum on which importing regions depend (another significant 
aspect of FSU natural gas)18. All of these additional.reserves 
within the international market will add to the competition with 
OPEC oil. 
B.  FOREIGN PETROLEUM CONTRACTS 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, oil and gas contracts 
between the various FSU governments and many private 
transnational oil corporations have been materializing at rates 
not anticipated by Western analysts. These contracts are not 
limited to just the world's largest petroleum importers, but it 
includes Australia, Sweden, Denmark, France, England, Norway, 
Ireland, and various other OECD joint venture countries.  The 
door has been opened, and any country with the capital and a high 
threshold for risky adventures is now a player. Russia, unlike 
many of the other former Soviet oil-producing republics, had 
divided its petroleum-rich regions into tracts in order to 
control the monopolist power of any single foreign oil company. 
In addition, the Russian Federation ensures 51 percent control of 
most fields in order to justify sovereignty of its petroleum 
industry.  The rush to invest in the former Soviet Union 
(potential investment by foreign firms is estimate at $60-70 
billion) has had some shortfalls due to an unfavorable climate of 
18Hartshorn, p. 277. 
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export restrictions19.  For instance, the Russian Federation 
taxes on total revenue from petroleum sales instead of taxation 
of profits.  For this reason, by the time foreign corporations 
pay taxes, the margin for profit nears zero. Without profit, 
initial investments cannot be paid off, and the. return on 
investment plunges into the negative column.  Thus, the 
reluctance to invest by smaller corporations is currently limited 
by unfair tax laws and export tariffs. 
The contracts and joint ventures signed to date have 
included many well-known and established Western oil firms. 
These companies have established strongholds on some of the most 
lucrative undeveloped petroleum regions in the world outside the 
Middle East.  The following contracts include some of the largest 
and most promising deals involving transnational oil companies: 
(1) Chevron Corporation (USA) has signed a contract with 
Kazakhstan in order to develop the Tengiz fields off the Caspian 
Sea (May 1992).  This project is estimated to yield almost one 
million barrels per day by the year 2000 and estimated reserves 
between 30-60 billion barrels20.  Problems that stem from Caspian 
Sea exploration include jurisdictional authority and distribution 
of revenue.  The Caspian is surrounded by five countries 
(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaidzhan, and the Russian 
Federation) which have refused to make concessions over the 
19
"Russia aims for favorable climate for joint ventures", 
Oil and Gas Journal, August 10, 1992, p. 19. 
20John Greenwald, "Black Gold Rush", Time Magazine, July 4, 
1994, p. 54. 
28 
rt iction . n a , h ss er t o
a ev rom roleum n tea a io
fit . , h im ig r t
ax ., h ar i fi . it t fit,
n t t , , u
n tm t t u . us,
u an t all r t t im
f i a rt .
t t t t g t
n u a el -know sh ester il r s.
es pani sh ron l o ost
l roleum orl t
iddl ast. low tr t st
ost isi l ra t l il panies:
he r orporat ) g tr t it
azakhst r l e gi f as i
2). hi r j t im t i ost
ill  rr l  r  r  im t  
 -  i io  rr l 20 . r s t e  ro aspi  
 l r t   l t ri i ib
f e. e aspi   o   untri  
azakhstan, ur enistan, , zerbai zhan,   ussi  
ederati ) hi     ake cessi s er  
19"Ru sia s r r l at  r i t entures", 
il  as r al, ugust , 92, . . 
20Joh  reen ald, l  ol  ush", i e agazine, l  , 
94, . 4. 
 
jurisdiction of petroleum rights within the Caspian Sea waters. 
This will be a major milestone if an agreement is to be reached; 
(2) Mega Oil USA/Vista Joint Venture, Inc., Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma has signed a deal with Azerbaidzhan to work over 1500 
wells and drill 400 more in the Baku region; (3) British 
Petroleum Co. and Norway's Den Norsky signed an agreement with 
the Azeri government to conduct a feasibility study of Chirag, 
estimated to hold one billion barrels of oil reserves; (4) 
British Petroleum and Unocal signed an agreement to develop Azeri 
field which is believed to hold 1.8 billion barrels of reserves; 
(5) Nationale Elf Aquitaine (France) signed a production-sharing 
contract with Moscow to develop various Volgograd-Saratov fields 
with estimated reserves considerable but undisclosed; (6) Amoco 
and Shell are developing sites in the Khanty-Mansiisk region of 
Western Siberia (this region along with the Siberian Tyumen 
region are the largest known reserves in the FSU and the most 
industrially developed); and (7) Royal Dutch and Shell have 
signed feasibility studies to determine the development of the 
Sakhalin Island (off East Siberian coast in the Pacific-Okhotsk 
Sea).  The entire eastern coastal shelf of Siberia is estimated 
to contain 167.9-189.8 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE)21. 
This estimate (if correct) would place this region second to 
Saudi Arabia for total world reserves. 
21
"Russia to offer huge eastern offshore Tracts", Oil and 
Gas Journal, May 10, 1993, p. 21. 
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There are various other pending contracts and joint ventures 
but many have not been approved by the respective governments. 
If more Western countries are allowed to exploit the massive 
unaccounted reserves within the FSU, these new contracts could be 
the first in a slew of petroleum deals in the FSU that could 
reshape the world oil industry in the next century. Many 
geological analysts estimate up to 250 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent (BOE) will be discovered in Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Azerbaidzhan.  This is one fourth of the actual world reserves at 
present (1 trillion BOE)22.  The potential for new reserves is 
massive, but without international assistance, production 
possibilities will most likely never be achieved (and will not 
reach 1988 production levels). 
The process of acquiring contracts, licenses, and 
registrations for petroleum exploitation is a constantly changing 
business within Russia. Many times the inherent flaws within the 
legal system which prevent foreign investment (e.g., high taxes 
and changes enacted through presidential decrees) are also the 
very ones created through bureaucratic controls on private 
Russian enterprises.  For Russia and the independent states, the 
legal systems provide the true reform which would establish the 
necessary framework for impartiality and permit a more profit 
oriented atmosphere. 
22Rose Brady and Peter Galuszka, "The Scramble for Oil's 
Last Frontier", Business Week, January 11, 1993, p. 42. 
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There are numerous other considerations which must be 
pondered by a transnational oil corporation prior to entering any 
contract. These include tax treaties, loans, arbitration, and 
political risk insurance. The tax treaty currently in effect 
between Russia and the U.S. allows for a current withholding rate 
for repatriation of all profits outside Russia at 15 percent. 
The tax treaty is negotiable but has not changed since the USSR- 
U.S. Tax Treaty was enacted in 1973. Today, a new treaty with 
the following provisions is expected to be ratified by both 
states:  (1) withholding tax on dividends will be reduced from 15 
percent to 5 percent if western ownership of the stock is greater 
than 10 percent; (2) Russian withholding tax of 15 percent on 
interest income will be eliminated; (3) Russian withholding tax 
of 20 percent on royalties will be eliminated; and (4) Russian 
profits tax is anticipated to be creditable for U.S. foreign tax 
credit purposes.  These provisions of the treaty may make it more 
advantageous for western companies to directly invest in Russia 
rather than through offshore companies in countries such as 
Cyprus. 
Loans can also be another major barrier to companies with 
limited assets.  The capital investment for an initial venture is 
typically the responsibility of the western company.  The western 
company provides the capital for the venture in the form of a 
loan to the venture.  The loan is repaid in a priority position 
from the venture revenues.  The loan is col lateral i zed with the 
venture assets or is guaranteed by the Russian partner (if there 
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is one) , with oil reserves or tangible venture equipment.  The 
loan is repaid to the western company with the capital portion 
not subject to repatriation tax. By capitalizing the venture in 
the form of loans, the venture profitability is delayed which 
defers the application of profits tax. The payout of the venture 
occurs after the loan is paid.  For these reasons, we see many 
loans which extend 30-40 years into the future.  In addition, 
western companies must also be apprised of current treaties and 
laws which are many times circumvented by presidential decrees 
which take a higher precedence. 
With this in mind, the willingness to go to arbitration can 
be a very significant agreement between parties prior to signing 
any contract.  Russia signed the United Nations International 
Convention for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSOD) on June 16, 
1992.  This provides options for the resolution of investment 
disputes pursuant to ICSOD procedures with the ICSOD Secretary 
General acting as the appointing authority of arbitrators.  ICSOD 
is beneficial for western companies because there is a set 
procedure for arbitration including resolution of any issues 
concerning jurisdiction as well as a mechanism for collecting on 
judgements. Agreements must refer to the treaty and consent to 
ICSOD jurisdiction to be effective. 
Lastly, every investment carries some form of risk including 
technological, foreign exchange, marketing, cultural, and 
political.  The term "political risk" has become a catch-all 
.phrase to include any risk attributable to politically related 
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sources.  Political risk insurance is an option many investors 
are considering.  The U.S. provides coverage through the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC, a federally- 
chartered insurance program that provides coverage for new 
investments if the investment is approved by the Russian 
government, benefits the socio-economic development of Russia and 
does not conflict with U.S. national interest. 
OPIC programs provide insurance against loss due to specific 
risks including war, revolution, insurrection, expropriation, 
abrogation of contractual rights, and incovertiblity of currency. 
Risk insurance is by no means a panacea (along with ICSOD) . When 
an operation is expropriated, the investor is only compensated 
for the value of the assets without taking into account future 
cash flow value23.  This insurance is primarily a tool to 
encourage private enterprises to enter the world of transnational 
resource exploitation. Risk assessment must ultimately be 
weighed against the profitability of the known resources.  In the 
end, the profits taken home are the only real measurement of 
success. 
C.  PIPELINE ISSUES 
The infrastructure for oil and gas pipelines within the 
former Soviet Union is as much a problem as is the lack of 
production and exploration.  The need to repair, upgrade, and 
extend existing pipelines would considerably expand production 
23Jack and Karen Krug, "Russian Ventures". Oil and Gas 
Journal, February 22, 1995, pp. 66-69. 
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capability. Most of the existing pipeline and exploration 
equipment technology is over thirty-five years old. 
Consequently, the past two years has produced numerous pipeline 
accidents and the spillage of thousands of barrels of crude into 
the surface environment.  Spills and pipeline breaks are mainly 
caused by metal fatigue which ultimately results in the loss of 
production. The lack of funds has caused the problems to 
escalate without any foreseeable relief. The necessity to entice 
western technology and capital is now a priority and not just a 
future interest. 
The transport of more than 90 percent of oil production is 
accomplished through a massive pipeline network which is operated 
by Transneft (the former national oil transport ministry).  The 
total length of this system is about 43,470 miles with 600 
pumping stations and a storage capacity of over 107 million 
barrels.  The scale of this system and its significance to both 
the domestic and export economies places Transneft in a critical 
position as facilitator of intrastate trade, hard currency 
generation, and ultimately economic stability.  Transneft's 
pipeline operations is controlled by 17 regional centers, 10 of 
which are within the Russian Federation24.  The efficient 
operation of these centers is crucial to the move towards a 
market economy. 
24Paul Davies, "The Challenge of New Pipeline Systems in 
Russia and the Republics", Pipeline and Gas Journal, March 1992, 
pp. 22-25. 
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Transneft controls the flow of oil throughout the 
independent states.  This government agency works under 
Rosneftegaz which is the sole coordinator for all oil and gas 
deliveries.  Rosneftegaz works directly for the Russian 
Federation government. This system which is similar to the 
former Soviet system of Ministry for Oil and Gas will most likely 
not change anytime in the near future.  Currently, it is 
necessary to have one agency coordinate the overall operations of 
the pipeline system which is predominantly contained within the 
Russian Federation's petroleum network. This system of control 
directly benefits Russia as the sole provider and transport link 
to foreign and intrastate markets.  This is very similar to the 
command economy under the Soviet Union.  The pattern of gas 
pipeline construction and control has essentially followed that 
of the oil pipeline network. The unified gas supply system which 
consists of gas reserves, transmission systems, is under the 
control of Gazprom (the largest natural gas supplier in the 
world).  The former Soviet gas pipeline network totals 43,500 
miles of transmission pipeline. The major construction emphasis 
has been in Western Siberia in order to bring gas westward for 
domestic consumption and export.  Like the oil pipelines, Russia 
controls over 85 percent of the entire network25. Due to the 
enormous control of the pipeline networks by the Russian 
Federation, all the independent states depend upon Moscow either 
25Davies, p. 28. 
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for petroleum supply, transmission, distribution, or internal 
security. 
In some instances, the degree of dependency is also a factor 
for Moscow. Due to the division and concentration of certain 
industries in specific regions during the Soviet era, some 
industries such as the manufacturers of petroleum industry 
equipment and supplies are concentrated in one region, 
Azerbaidzhan. Russia receives over 60 percent of its oil field 
equipment from Azerbaidzhan. This equipment is not very good but 
until a better source is found from Western technology and the 
funds are available for purchases, Russia will sustain current 
production with antiquated technology.  Russia still has the 
upperhand since the majority of Azeri petroleum must be 
transported through the Northern Caucasus via Grozny and on to 
Western markets.  Baku authorities are attempting to modify this 
situation by finding alternative routes to transport petroleum. 
Currently, there exists four alternative routes, but each poses 
serious problems. 
The first option is to pipe oil out through Iran to the 
Persian Gulf.  For a moderate fee, Teheran could make their 
pipeline available for crude oil from the Azeri field.  The 
Western interest through a consortium of Amoco, Britain's British 
Petroleum, and Norway's Statoil have joined together to take a 
share in the Azeri venture, but the ideological differences in 
the political atmospheres in Iran and the U.S. has prevented the 
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signing of a contract with Tehran26. This route will most likely 
not be an option for any time in the near future. 
The second option is for Azerbaidzhan to utilize an existing 
oil pipeline to the Black Sea via Armenia and Georgia.  This 
pipeline has been shut down due to the pogroms and internal 
conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the unrelated civil 
unrest in neighboring Georgia. There also exists technical 
pipeline problems stemming from pumping station maintenance and 
sabotage. Until the ethnic rivalries cease, the Azeri government 
and the Western consortium will not risk sending oil across this 
route27. 
The third option is to build a pipeline across Turkey to an 
outlet on the Aegean Sea. Turkey seeks to build a pipeline from 
Turkmenistan through the Caspian, or Iran, Azerbaidzhan, and then 
to Eastern Turkey. With this in mind, Turkey could have 
predominance over the region's economy and the surrounding states 
would become satellites of whoever controlled the pipelines and 
ports. Russia, however, would never tolerate such a situation 
since the Black Sea trade is vital to the Russian Federation's 
export trade and access to the Straits into the Aegaen Sea.  In 
addition to the complexities of this situation, the U.S. supports 
Turkish claims regarding the dangers of oil spills by Russian 
26T Peter Fuhrman, "Caught between the Republics", Forbes 
October 14, 1991, pp. 44-45. ' 
27Stephen Blank, Energy and Security in Transcaucasia. 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute Army War 
College), September 7, 1994, p. 10. 
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tankers in the Black Sea. Major oil spills have occurred due to 
tanker collisions which pose a serious ecological threat to 
Turkish shorelines. A further complication has been the attack 
of Kurds who have already caused major damages to Turkey's 
existing pipelines28.  These threats, if not resolved through 
peaceful means, will soon make the entire project extremely 
doubtful. 
The fourth alternative would be the utilization of Russian 
pipelines, but this creates a myriad of problems which the Azeris 
are not willing to resolve.  Russia has threatened to not mediate 
and provide peacemakers for the Karabakh War if Baku does not 
provide Moscow with twenty percent of all oil revenues29.  This 
would, in fact, allow the Armenians to further dominate 
Azerbaidzhan. Moscow could become more politically effective if 
Azerbaidzhan were isolated politically and militarily from other 
states, since Turkey and Iran will not intervene unilaterally or 
jointly against Russia30. Azerbaidzhan has resisted all Russian 
peace plans because they remove Azeri land and resources from 
Baku's control and sovereignty and place Russian bases on Azeri 
28Stephen Blank, Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the Former 
USSR and U.S. Interests (Carlisle Barracks, PA:  U.S. Army War 
College), July 1994, pp. 55-88. 
29Levine, "The Bear Pauses", The Economist, December 11, 
1993, p. 62. 
30Stephen Blank, Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the Former 
USSR and U.S. Interests (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College), July 1994, p. 58. 
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land31. All this indicates that while Russia is not responsible 
for the war, it is exploiting the conflict to promote clearly 
inequitable objectives. 
Other regions within the Russian Federation are also having 
their share of problems with petroleum pipelines, but the 
competition between states, petroleum companies, and political 
persuasions is not as prevalent.  For instance, the Trans-Urals 
Pipeline, which will extend from South Balyk in Western Siberia 
to the Volga-Urals region, will replace the non-gas liquid (NGL) 
transportation system that has been inoperative since the 
disastrous explosion near Ufa in 1989. This new pipeline will 
provide the needed boost to the ailing energy and petrochemical 
industries and will greatly reduce wastage of the abundant 
associated liquids.  In order for Moscow to control project 
economies along the pipeline route, an annual hard currency 
royalty to local authorities along the pipeline right-of-way is 
paid proportional to the total length of the pipeline in their 
jurisdiction. 
The drive for growth in the former Soviet oil and gas 
industry and the increased autonomy of the independent states 
provides great potential for Western companies to participate in 
the domestic pipeline industry.  Some of the specific factors 
include:  (1) the need to increase production to satisfy domestic 
demands and increase exports to support economic revival; (2) the 
need to overhaul and repair the unreliable and deteriorated 
31FBIS-USR, October 29, 1993, p. 50. 
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existing oil and gas pipeline systems; and (3) the need to 
develop an increasing number of smaller, more remote fields to 
maintain production levels, leading to an increase in average 
transported distance and overall pipeline length. Hydrocarbon 
transportation will form an intrinsic part of the major 
investment expected in the petroleum industry32.  The key areas 
for Western involvement are capital construction of new systems, 
maintenance and repair of pipelines and compressor stations, and 
the application of sophisticated inspection techniques for 
ensuring continued safe operation.  Only outside assistance from 
Western technology will permit the petroleum industry of each 
respective oil and gas local economy to survive and flourish into 
the twenty-first century. 
32i 2Paul Davies, "The Challenge of New Pipeline Systems in 
Russia and The Republics", Pipeline and Gas Journal, March 1992, 
p. 29. 
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III.  RUSSIAN PETROLEUM AS AN ECONOMIC - CONFIDENCE 
BUILDER 
In the twentieth century, Russia has consumed an inordinate 
amount of energy in order to support an economically backward 
society and an extraordinarily wasteful military-industrial 
complex. The current situation in Russia suggests efficiency and 
environmentally-safe fuel regulation will not be a priority 
anytime in the near future due to the lack of effective petroleum 
reform by the Yeltsin administration. 
This chapter will analyze ineffective Russian oil and gas 
policy which has stagnated domestic production and impeded 
international exportation. The geopolitical situation in the 
former Soviet Union is in a state of turmoil. Azerbaidzhan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kazahkstan, which currently produce oil and 
have formalized contracts with transnational oil corporations are 
experiencing setbacks due to internal war, the deterioration and 
lack of oil pipeline infrastructure, and Russian claims to a 
percentage of energy revenues33. Energy is exclusively the prime 
economic commodity which can benefit the oil-producing states, 
but unfortunately, they are currently unable to break the bonds 
of Moscow. 
33e.g., Russia claims 10-20 percent of all revenues from 
petroleum sales in Azerbaidzhan in exchange for unilateral 
security guarantees by the Russian Armed Forces. The 
deterioration of the petroleum infrastructure is due to the lack 
of maintenance and water incursion. 
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A.  CURRENT RUSSIAN PETROLEUM POLICY 
The Soviet Union's oil industry throughout the communist era 
has been characterized by numerous reorganizational activities. 
For example in 1957, Khrushchev abolished central control of the 
oil industry and created 110 regional sovnarkhozs (independent 
control centers).  The idea was to transfer sufficient limited 
power from Moscow to the regional republics. This may appear at 
the surface as an ideal position for establishing further 
republican autonomy, but in reality, the central functions of 
control were held on to by GOSPLAN (the State Planning 
Organization) .  Throughout Khrushchev's reign of power and 
including his successors, the energy policy and administrative 
functions changed periodically. 
The greatest problem of oil during the communist era was the 
fluctuations of total yield. By the end of the 1930's, yield 
from the Baku fields diminished dramatically due to 
overproduction.  Production fell temporarily in 1932, and 
impressively increased again until 1938, then leveled off34.  The 
targets set for the end of the second Five-Year Plan (1938) 
lagged behind the estimated petroleum production quotas.  The 
limited technology at the disposal of the Soviets could not 
increase the production at the historical fields in Baku and 
Grozny.  Fortunately, significant new fields were discovered 
between the Volga and the Urals.  This region, referred to as the 
34Marshall I. Goldman,  The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum 
(London:  George Allen & Unwin Publishers, 1980), p. 30. 
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 Second Baku', did not begin to produce petroleum until after 
World War II due to a shortage of proper drilling equipment35. 
Why is this background significant to the Soviet petroleum 
industry, now under Russian auspices? The oil industry has 
consistently gone through states of change. The petroleum 
policies prior to the Bolshevik Revolution and World War II 
display similar characteristics of those experienced today. For 
example, the Soviets sought technological assistance and foreign 
marketing of their petroleum. Companies like Standard Oil and 
Shell exploited the chance to sell- and market Soviet oil. The 
concept of permitting multinational enterprises to conduct trade 
did not pose an ideological threat to the Soviets. The Soviet 
Union (politics aside) did not hesitate to sell oil to Hitler's 
Nazi Germany or to Mussolini's fascists, even when the popular 
political line should have precluded such action36.  In the USSR, 
ideology very rarely stood as a barrier to the principle of 
profit. 
Due to the possibility of future energy shortages, the 
Soviets justified the need for foreign assistance.  The fear of 
losing production (necessary to supply domestic demand and 
provide foreign currency) was in the forefront of oil and gas 
policy. A percentage of oil prior to World War II (about 29 
percent) was set aside for strictly export markets.  This policy 
35Iain F. Elliot, The Soviet Energy Balance (New York: 
Praeger, 1993), p. 72. 
36Marshall I.Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers, 1980), p. 30. 
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continued up through the 1970's, but eventually by the mid 1980s 
levels climbed above 50 percent of export revenues; and today, 
the Russian government receives 60 percent of export revenues 
through oil exports37.  These figures suggest the dependency of 
Russian markets upon the foreign exchange from oil revenues. 
Just over seven years ago, the Soviet Union was the largest 
oil producer with an annual production capacity of over 12.5 
million barrels of oil per day.  The Soviet Union could afford to 
postpone economic reform at that time. Today with annual 
production at less than 7 million barrels per day, the revenues 
do not even account for the increase in inflation.  Due to the 
poor economic performance and decrease in domestic demand for 
oil, the impact of Russian oil upon the world market has been 
negligible. Hard currency from exported products (especially 
petroleum) is essential for any type of economic recovery. At 
current hyperinflated rates, oil and gas earnings are only half 
Moscow's entire budget deficit38. 
Even though oil production continues to decrease, the 
estimated number of reserves continues to grow.  Reserves 
estimated in the last couple of years have quadrupled since the 
1980 estimates39.  One must remember that less than seven years 
37Howard Banks, "The Land of a Thousand Leaks", Forbes, July 
8, 1991, p. 35. 
38Daniel Yergin and Jospeh Stanislaw, "Oil:  Reopening the 
Door", Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993, pp. 85-86. 
39Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, Russia 2010 - And What 
It Means for the World (New York:  Random House, 1993)p. 115. 
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ago the Russian oil industry was still closed to the outside 
world. Estimates were not based on geological surveys. Today, 
transnational oil companies and foreign investors are more aware 
of the potential hidden fortune within the former Soviet borders. 
The problems stem from open but restrictive Russian petroleum 
policies. These policies rely upon controlling the flow of oil 
to the independent states40, controlling the flow of oil out of 
the independent oil-producing states, placing taxes (as high as 
70% of gross revenues) on oil exported by Western transnational 
oil corporations, and annulling terms of foreign contracts 
without prior notification. 
Russia does not possess any written policy which 
specifically plans or imposes directives on formal oil and gas 
policy. Boris Yeltsin compounds decree upon decree in order to 
establish political legitimacy for his presidency. This is 
evident from the following events:  the Russian Army was able to 
manipulate a decree from President Yeltsin which allowed it to 
keep more money made from arms exports, another event is the 
various decrees declared by Yeltsin which have cancelled tax 
treaties and increased royalties paid to the state.  The unequal 
division of state powers within the Russian Federation creates a 
massive advantage to the power of the president (this dates back 
to the coup of 1993). This behavior creates an atmosphere of 
40These independent states refer to the former Soviet 
republics which receive a majority of their petroleum from 
Russia. The independent oil-producing states include: 
Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Russia. 
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illusion and corruption.  Could this be construed as a capitalist 
venture, or does such action insinuate a lack of concern for the 
economic security of Russia or just a weak submission to 
political pressure? The loss of a political ideology and the 
adherence to a weak constitution has created corruption within 
Russia that can only be changed through distinct division of 
power between president and parliament, empowerment of the public 
through impartial ballot box elections, and the encouragement of 
public freedom of expression and capitalist enterprise in the 
private sector. When a leader such as Yeltsin, has been 
admonished by past economic and political adversity, pragmatic 
resolutions should guide him towards continued reform.  This is 
not the case within the borders of the Russian Federation. 
The oil and gas industry has more ancient built-in 
giveaways than any other industry.  Transport costs are extremely 
high (due to lack of maintenance and transport losses from 
pipeline leakage) while the cost for a single barrel of crude oil 
($6.50 within Russia) is conversely low in order to offset 
transport costs.  Taxes and export levies have been eliminated 
for domestic oil companies, but conversely, foreign companies 
must pay an exorbitant penalty for cooperating with Russian 
demands for new oil well exploitation and development.  The 
paradox of such policy has been new taxes on Western companies of 
about $100 million and concessions to Russian oil exporters at a 
cost to the Russian Treasury of almost ten-fold.  The United 
States in 1993 saw the urgency to capitalize and assist in the 
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development of Russian oil by earmarking $2 billion dollars for 
credits and guarantees to U.S. oil companies willing to invest in 
Russia's oil industry. None of this money has been claimed since 
some U.S. companies do not trust President Yeltsin and cannot 
foresee taking such a high risk (this excludes some of the larger 
companies like Chevron and Amoco who believe the risk of not 
investing in Russian oil could be even more costly)41. 
Corruption appears to be the primary source of inconsistent 
petroleum policy. A former minister of economics under President 
Yeltsin claims that the recent revocation of special export 
licenses to certain Russian firms has created mass confusion. 
According to this source, export licenses are the major source of 
graft; to obtain one, Russian companies fork over to bureaucrats 
a bribe equal to 10 percent of the expected annual revenues from 
the license. 
Many of the ideas for petroleum policy are promulgated by 
former Communist Party technocrat and boss of Gazprom, Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin. Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
have bestowed special privileges on companies such as Gazprom 
which include exemption from import duties and taxes, and deals 
which allow it to convert the dollars earned on gas to rubles at 
double the official rate42.  Such policy has intimidated 
transnational oil corporations from building capital investment. 
41Peter Fuhrman, "What Boris Gives . . .", Forbes, August 
15, 1994, pp. 42-43. 
42
"Steady Rise in Oil, Gas Demand Ahead", Oil and Gas 
Journal, June 6, 1994, p. 34. 
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An objective investor would have yelled foul much sooner, but the 
enormous prospects for billions of barrels of unclaimed crude oil 
and comparable gas reserves are too valuable to leave untouched. 
One has to wonder whether Yeltsin's actions merit approval from 
the old party line or his corrupt behavior is just a phase in the 
establishment of a market economy.  Boris Fyodorov, the former 
finance minister, suggests that its a "replay of the last days of 
Gorbachev, with the leader talking about reform while granting 
favors and privileges to the groups who most strongly oppose 
it"43. 
Russian petroleum policy with respect to the independent 
states has demonstrated even more deterioration. Moscow has used 
the control of oil (e.g., restrictions placed on the disposition 
of oil and the rationing of fuel) to force or at least persuade 
the states of Ukraine, and Belarus into an economic integration 
and political unity with Russia44. Mikhail Gorbachev attempted 
to force the subjugation of the Baltics by cutting off their 
energy supply, but the Baltics made requests from Western 
suppliers and were spared an economic debacle.  This policy of 
economic warfare is not an isolated incident.  In March 1994, 
Russia slashed deliveries to Ukraine and Belarus due to combined 
unpaid debts of over $1.14 billion to Moscow.  Due to the drastic 
cuts, Ukraine has reportedly siphoned off oil supplies destined 
43Quoted from Peter Fuhrman, What Boris Gives . . .", 
Forbes, August 15, 1994, p. 43. 
44Jerry F. Hough, "Russia Aims its Oil Weapon", The New York 
Times, June 17, 1993, p. A25. 
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for Turkey from pipelines transversing its territory45. The 
obvious ramifications of this untimely action has created a 
situation of dependency on Russia for economic survival. 
The imperialistic policy observed here places the motives by 
Moscow at risk with the reform necessary to build a functional 
economic community. The states which produce oil for interstate 
markets, primarily Russia, Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan are dependent upon petroleum exports for their 
primary path to the world market. The necessity for future 
investment and development depends primarily upon the hard 
currency revenues available through the export of oil and gas. 
Control over petroleum is the only foreseeable means of securing 
a future manifested with the choice of economic and political 
freedom. 
Petroleum policy within Russia and the independent states is 
at a critical juncture. The need by the independent states to 
acquire enough oil for daily operation is the first milestone. 
Next, policy must put forth limited restrictions on foreign 
companies in order to attract Western development. Moscow must 
also be willing to harmonize political and economic relations 
with the independent states before internal war consumes the 
entire former Soviet sphere. The imperialistic tendencies, noted 
by Western experts, must be abated through the realization of 
common grounds and the formation of a unified ideology 
45
"Russia Slashes Energy Deliveries", The Oil and Gas 
Journal, March 4, 1994, p. 4(1). 
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(preferably political independence and economic unity) .  The 
process of building free markets will only be possible through 
less restrictive controls.  Petroleum policy cannot become 
standardized unless cooperation is sought by all. 
B.  INTERSTATE RELATIONS 
The relationships between Russia, the TransCaucasian states, 
the Central Asian states, the Baltics, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova are complex and constantly changing due to a lack of 
foreign policy concensus.  Oil is the primary foundation of many 
of the disputes which directly affect the economic survival of 
most of the states of the former Soviet Union.  Less than half 
of the FSU states produce their own petroleum products, but they 
all depend upon one another for crucial petroleum trade.  The 
focus here will be the dependent nature of trade relationships 
and the specific action and reaction of Moscow's behavior towards 
the independent states. The most crucial and probably the most 
threatening region for instability is the Transcaucasus. Besides 
the existence of warring factions, the flow of oil has been 
disrupted through piracy syphoning while in transit through this 
volatile region.  The major motivation for terminating the 
persistent corruption between states is the rewards for economic 
cooperation. As detailed by many of the experts in the post- 
Soviet field of studies, the problems dealing with the lack of 
cooperation originate mainly from ethnic diversity.  This study 
will not focus on the solvency of ethnic disputes but rather the 
action by Russia (Moscow) to provoke ethnic conflict and then 
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offer solutions (usually by military intervention disguised as 
peacekeepers) to thwart international influence and to gain the 
upper hand in Transcaucasian internal matters. Steven Blank, the 
professor for post-Soviet studies at the U.S. Army War College 
captures this idea very well: 
Russia is obviously motivated by the lucrative 
possibilities implicit in being a key player in all 
aspects of the energy business,   e.g.,  by directing the 
energy trade flows of the other post-Soviet republics 
in Transcaucasia and Central Asia back to it and its 
transport network46. 
Russia does not explicitly use doctrine or mutual agreements to 
interject solutions for this region but rather an implicit use of 
imperial legacy.  Since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
independence of these states has not automatically granted 
freedom of mineral rights. This is proven through the linkage of 
Russian military intervention and Moscow's claim to 
unrelinquished energy rights. 
Azerbaidzhan, the main producer of oil and gas in 
Transcaucasia, is hampered by an intense struggle with Armenia 
over the former province of Nagorno-Karabakh. The effects on 
both states have been extremely costly. This former province has 
sought its autonomy from Azerbaidzhan dating back to 1988. The 
population of Nagorho-Karabakh consists mainly of ethnic 
Armenians. The ensuing struggle has virtually brought both 
economies to a standstill.  Consequently, the Russian government 
46Quoted from Stephen J. Blank, "Energy and Security in 
Transcaucasia", Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, September 7, 1994, p. 1. 
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under Boris Yeltsin has exploited the situation by imposing a 
peace settlement to enhance Moscow's regional strategic position. 
If Moscow can impose a peace plan of its own, the result could be 
a possible payback of oil and gas. One can only speculate about 
the ulterior motives, but one thing is certain Russia does not 
have explicit motives. 
To complicate matters, the struggle for oil in this region 
involves additional players to include Turkey and Iran.  In March 
1992, Turkey proposed a solution to the Karabakh War which would 
bestow upon it unmediated access to a direct pipeline from 
Turkmenistan that bypassed regional Iranian and Russian 
influence47. Moscow was extremely upset that such a scheme was 
even considered by Turkey since it had no economic grounds to 
base its claim.  With such a pipeline, Turkey, Azerbaidzhan, and 
Central Asia could be integrated into a single economic community 
in the absence of Russian influence.  Turkey would be the 
collection and tranfer point to Western markets via the Bosporus 
and Dardanelles. 
Iran, on the other hand, has a special relationship with 
Moscow which permits it access to this region but under Russian 
auspices.  Teheran also has very good relations with Armenia and 
Azerbaidzhan but only because these states fear a Russian/Iranian 
coalition of force from both the north and the south.  The 
relationship between Moscow and Teheran rests on the latter being 
47Paul A. Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis", 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 1992, pp. 19-26. 
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a prime recipient of the Russian arms trade still in effect since 
the days of the Soviet Union. Russia places restrictions (e.g., 
influence through limited trade, and power politics due to arms 
trade) on Teheran mainly due to its Muslim fundamentalist threat. 
This appears to be the biggest threat from the south. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has many sides (CSGE, Russia, 
Turkey) to the proposed mediation process. The CSCE Minsk Group 
attempted several sessions of negotiations to terminate 
hostilities, but each was rejected by Azerbaidzhan since no 
provisions were made for an Armenian withdrawal from the Lachin 
Corridor and the return of refugees displaced by the fighting 
were not considered in the resolution48.  In 1993, Yeltsin's 
envoy Kazimirov stated that Russia, would resolve the conflict on 
one of four levels: as a member of the CSCE Minsk Group, with 
the United Nations, acting independently, or on the basis of 
bilateral consultations. Russia worked for a unilateral Azeri 
resolution which would place Russian troops within Azerbaidzhan 
with a stipulation that Russia would be guaranteed a share in the 
Western Consortium that is to develop Azeri offshore oil 
deposits. Moscow can afford to focus on an Azeri solution since 
the economic benefits directly relate to Russian economic 
advantages. Georgia and Armenia already depend upon Russia for 
most petroleum products.  For this reason, Russia can focus its 
efforts on Azerbaidzhan and the prospective oil deposits. 
48T Elizabeth Fuller, "Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Karabakh 
Mediation Process", RFE/RL Research Report, Volume 3, Number 8, 
February 25, 1994, p. 32. 
53 
 im t h ssi ra t n
h h i t ni . ussi ctio .,
n lue hrou imi ra , er lit
ra r ai l usl entalist t.
i r st t rom t .
agor ar fli t a C C , ussia,
r ) ediat ess. i r
tem t r l oti t r i t
stilit , t a zer i
i er a r eni it al rom i
orri r g n
er t si o 48 . 3, eltsi '
azi ir t u sia. oul nfli t
l : e ber i s r up, it
nit ati s, dentl , r si f
i l sult t s. ussi or il t r l zeri
hi oul ussi ro it i zer ai
it ip o t ussi oul  ar t  r  
ester onsort u t l zeri r  il
posits. os  zeri l t   
i nefit i t ussi i
ant es. eorgi r eni e ussi
ost oleu  r ucts. r i , ussi    
rt  zer ai  r ecti  il posits. 
48Elizabet  u ler, u sia, ur ey, ,   ar
ediati  r cess", / esear eport, ol , u ber , 
r r  , 4, . . 
 
The instinctive reaction from Azerbaidzhan was to reject any 
coercive resolution from Moscow in order to secure a future of 
economic and political independence.  Ironically since the defeat 
of President Abulfaz Elchibey (by a coup) and the ruling 
Azerbaidzhani Popular Front in June 1993, the former 
Azerbaidzhani Communist Party First Secretary Geidar Aliev, has 
considered fundamental changes to foreign policy with regard to 
an impending defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict49. The 
modification to this policy (which originally refused formal 
relations with Moscow) involved a rapprochement with Russia and 
membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States.  This 
policy position compromised any advancement made since the 
establishment of independence by allowing Moscow a voice in the 
resolution of the conflict.  Such recourse promotes an ideal 
position for Russian influence to capture a foothold in the 
region. Due to the poor performance by Azerbaidzhan in the 
Nagorno-Karbakh conflict and the change of political 
administrations, Russia now has the means to exploit local 
instability for its own geopolitical benefit50. 
The Western (primarily the United States) and Turkish 1992 
pipeline plan mentioned earlier was drawn up by Paul Goble, a 
U.S. State Department expert on nationalities.  According to 
Moscow, this plan allowed Washington to covertly support Turkey's 
49 
'Fuller, p. 51. 
50c °Stephen J. Blank, "Energy and Security in Transcaucasia", 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 7, 
1994, p. 7. 
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proposals and coincidently redraw the balance of power in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia51. This scenario explains the failure 
of the CSCE Minsk Group proposed solution of placing and 
controlling peacekeepers in the region. Moscow would not allow 
Western involvement in a problem involving only former Soviet 
republics.  It can be postulated from this situation that a 
Western solution to the turmoil in the region will not be seen 
any time in the near future. As for the production and 
distribution of Azeri oil, the future seems bleak until all 
parties can agree on their role as part of the solution. The 
current conditions suggest a stalemate with all parties losing 
economic benefits and gaining only greater political and economic 
turmoil. The Russian objective appears to be a coercive attempt 
to draw the Transcaucasian states back into a "Russian-dominated 
states system with a lasting Russian military presence to be paid 
for by Azeri oil shipments to Moscow and Russian participation in 
the regional energy economy with no prior investment"52. 
Azerbaidzhan is by no means the only state in the Caucasus 
which depends on the petroleum trade in the region.  The states 
of Armenia and Georgia do not produce their own oil but depend 
almost exclusively on oil from pipelines which transverse through 
Ukraine and Russia. Much of the oil flowing into this region 
51Stephen Blank and Colonel William Doll, The Gendarme of 
Eurasia:  Peacemeaking a la Russe Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994, p. 8. 
52Stephen J. Blank, "Energy and Security in Transcaucasia", 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 7, 
1994. ü. 9. , p ,
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raust cross through the Russian autonomous region of Chechnya 
where currently Russian and Chechen troops are fighting over 
Chechnya's independence.  The involvement of these regions with 
internal and external war has created a state of economic 
uncertainty.  The Armenians and Georgians do not know how much 
petroleum will be delivered and when it will be delivered.  In 
addition, both states have enormous debts for petroleum already 
delivered. 
Georgia has been fighting its own internal war with the 
Abkhazians and also the Southern Ossetians. Russia has attempted 
to mediate the process and convince all sides the fighting would 
be futile, but particularly the Georgians have spurned such 
resolution. Moscow neglects to see the significance of Georgian 
export market in bolstering economic confidence (besides an 
outlet for cheap oil and gas) for Russia, so the main resolution 
has been threats to stop the fighting or face economic sanctions. 
For example in June of 1993, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
visited Tbilisi and gave the following warning:  "Russia can no 
longer allow people to die, cities to be destroyed . . .; we 
believe it is inadmissible to violate a ceasefire"; he continued 
by threatening economic sanctions, specifically terminating oil 
supplies, against which ever side renewed hostilities53.  This 
statement by Kozyrev appears almost hypocritical compared to 
Russia's current atrocities in the Chechen conflict in Grozny. 
53Quoted from Elizabeth Fuller, "Russia's Diplomatic 
Offensive in the Transcaucasus", RFE/RL Research Report, Volume 
2, Number 39, October 1, 1993, p. 31. 
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Double standards had never been a weak point for Moscow 
throughout the Soviet era. 
In September of 1993, Russian Defense Minister Grachev 
proposed to deploy two Russian divisions to Abkhazia as 
peacekeeping forces, but this was rejected by the Russian 
parliament to the dismay of Eduard Shevardnadze (Georgian State 
Council Chairman). A few days later Defense Minister Grachev 
stated that he believed neither side wanted peace and a 
settlement was not up to Moscow but the United Nations54.  It is 
evident from this statement that Moscow was ready to defer the 
resolution to the international community since no economic or 
political benefit was in the cards for Russia.  This is the 
antithesis of the aforementioned Russian approach to the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict. 
States such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, rely heavily 
on cheap imported oil from Russia. Of the three, Ukraine is the 
only one which can produce approximately 11 percent of its 
domestic consumption (equal to about 19 million barrels per 
year) . The other two states produce less than five percent of 
the domestically consumed petroleum. Ukrainian state-owned oil 
firm, Ukrnaft, has signed a contract with a Canadian-owned oil 
firm, UK-ran Oil, to began enhanced recovery techniques on the 
known oil wells in Ukraine. This operation along with new 
exploration in the Carpathian region and the Black Sea shelf is 
estimated to give Ukraine complete energy self-sufficiency within 
54Krasnaya Zvezda, September 21, 1993, p. A-l. 
57 
oubl a r e i t os
o t viet .
ber 3, ussi ef s inist r r
l ussi bkhazi
i s, t a ussi
ia t sm ar r e r i t t
ouncil hai an).  e ef s inist r r
t l e i ant
tlem t a t os t nit ati .
i t rom atem t t os a f r
l unit i
lit l efit a u sia. hi
ti i e e t ussi agor -
ar nflict.
t t krai e, elar s, oldova, il
ort il rom u sia. f , krai
l hi r i atel r t
esti U pti l t ill rr l r
ar). r r t
esticall u t eu . krai i ate-ow il
r , krnaft, g tr t it c an-ow il
r , -r il, e
il ell krai e. hi er t it
l r t c t l l
im krai plet s icien it i
54Krasna e ber , 3, . -I.
ten years55. As for the states of Belarus and Moldova, there 
appears to be no way of breaking the economic bonds with Moscow, 
since they cannot afford to pay market prices for petroleum. 
Belarus comes the closest but less than ten percent of petroleum 
can be produced locally.  They have the capability of refining 
more than 1.5 times the daily consumption ratio, but refining 
capacity is useless without the crude oil production56. Both 
states understand that a close relationship with Moscow is 
indispensable and unavoidable. 
The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as 
observed from their split from the Soviet Union have shown no 
resolve for gaining closer ties with Moscow.  Yeltsin has stated 
to the Baltics and Ukraine (with reference to their independence 
and break with Moscow) that they must "immediately" pay for 
Russian energy with hard currency at world market prices.  This 
is extremely difficult when hard currency is not readily 
available for expensive oil imports.  The practice of modifying 
trade relations by playing "the energy card" to influence 
political election outcomes and to capitulate economic freedom 
has been a common practice since the demise of the Soviet 
Union57.  In the Baltics, the "energy card" has been utilized 
55Marco Levytsky, "First Canada-Ukraine Oil Deal to be 
Signed Soon", Ukrainian News, October 1994, p. 3. 
56
"CIS Members Seeking More Russian Crude", The Oil and Gas 
Journal, Volume 91, Number 29, p. 19. 
"Elizabeth Fuller, "The Baltic Question", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Volume 2, Number 17, April 12, 1993, pp. 44-47. 
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mainly for protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking 
minorities. The Baltics do not depend upon Russia for energy 
(although they are open to negotiation). The West has been 
extremely generous in extending credits and loan guarantees for 
energy products. The Baltics appear to be the most independent 
and resourceful of all the independent states when dealing with 
the power-politics of Moscow. They will survive without regard 
to any carrot or stick antics imposed by the Yeltsin 
administration. 
The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan have their own petroleum 
problems. The basin of the Caspian Sea offers astronomical oil 
prospects for Central Asia as well as the Caucasus. The most 
significant Central Asian field is located in the Tengiz Basin of 
Western Kazakhstan. The government of Kazakhstan has already 
signed a reported $20 billion deal with Chevron Corporation. 
Reserves are estimated at over sixteen billion barrels, about 
one-sixth the proven reserves of Kuwait. The unidentified 
reserves range from ten billion to over one hundred billion 
barrels. Another twelve billion barrels of oil lies under the 
Caspian Sea which is controlled in fields by Russia, 
Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan58. A field in North 
Ustient shared by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been identified 
with over one billion barrels of crude. The problems with 
58Michael Mandelbaum, Central Asia and the World (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), p. 139. 
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exploiting these fields have been the absence of transnational 
pipelines to transport the oil to market and the extremely high 
sulfur content which requires a complex and expensive refining 
process in all the fields. 
The Western interest in oil in this region is compounded by 
the lack of a formal petroleum policy which has never been 
enacted by these states. The West seeks to add Central Asian oil 
exports to the world's supply, sell technology and expertise 
necessary to exploit the Central Asian fields, and limit any 
participation by the state of Iran.  The "Iran factor" which 
poses a major threat to the region (e.g., pipeline control and 
the infiltration of Islamic fundamentalism) can only be minimized 
through Western monetary assistance subject to strict limitations 
(e.g., prohibit contracts with Iran in return for financial 
assistance which was a position taken by the former Bush 
administration). 
The Central Asian problem of ineffective and nonexistent 
petroleum policies' directly relates to the unanticipated and 
expeditious fall of the Soviet Union.  Since independence came so 
quickly, the Central Asian leaders had virtually no time to 
formulate petroleum policies with their suppliers.  In reality, 
this region was a pawn for whichever state had the desire and 
connections to exploit the weaknesses of each Central Asian 
state. The initial states which delved into this region in 
competition with each other for influence and leverage were 
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. These states were able to 
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convince Central Asia that they had much in common (e.g., 
religion, culture); and that it would be a mistake not to unite 
their peoples under a blanket of shared heritage. 
Turkey became the catalyst for future relations among the 
Central Asian states. Under influence from the United States and 
NATO (specifically an exchange of pledges between George Bush and 
Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel), Turkey agreed to expand 
aid to this region. Under George Bush, U.S. companies were 
encouraged to find Turkish partners with whom to do business in 
Central Asia. Bush wanted Central Asia to emulate a Turkish 
model of a democratic and secular state. This appeared to be the 
only way to preserve the status quo and to utilize Turkey in the 
process as a pawn to preserve peace and stability in the region. 
In reality, Turkey had already became the ideal dream 
country for the Central Asian elite.  It was westernized, close 
to the Americans but still Islamic and Turkic, and in whole, it 
offered exactly what the nomenklatura wanted.  They (Central 
Asians) believed Turkey could provide all the above and a perfect 
access to the West. They believed by using the "Turkish card" 
that they could prove to Moscow that they had a powerful foreign 
patron.  It also indicated the ability to diplomatically make 
foreign policy decisions without Moscow's interference. 
Turkey intended to placate Russia by negotiating with nine 
other countries in the formation of a Black Sea Economic 
Organization. Turkey, Azerbaidzhan, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova signed the accord on 25 June 1992 
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in Istanbul.  This accord gave Turkey a pre-eminent role in the 
region. Turkey had attempted to play a role in the resolution to 
the Armenia/Azerbaidzhan conflict, but its current military and 
economic aid to Azerbaidzhan made such a role dubious in the eyes 
of Armenians. 
By 1993, many Central Asian leaders were losing hope of 
Turkey's ability to deliver economic benefits due to a lack of 
Turkish investment and industrial promotion. At this point, 
Islamic fundamentalists promoted the idea that "Turkey was just a 
stalking horse for the Americans, who wanted to deprive Central 
Asia of its Islamic heritage and valuable oil"59.  The leaders of 
Central Asia soon realized that what was best in the interest of 
the West was not really beneficial to them. 
During 1992, Iran and Turkey faced off against one another 
in a continued rivalry to facilitate the rights for oil and gas 
pipelines in this region. Armenia, in 1993, requested gas from 
Iran which was supported by Russia to thwart the influence of 
Turkey in Azerbaidzhan.  Soon after, Russia encouraged 
Turkmenistan to build closer ties with Iran.  Iran insisted 
during this entire episode that they had no political interest in 
supporting Islamic groups or becoming involved in these states' 
domestic politics and economies, but in fact, this was exactly 
the outcome60. 
59Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia:  Islam or 
Nationalism (Great Britain:  Oxford Univeristy Press, 1994), pp. 
210-212. 
60Rashid, p. 213. 
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There are numerous rivalries between all the states of 
Central Asia.  The wealth of the "north" versus the growing 
impoverishment of the "south", along with numerous local ethnic 
and political problems, could very well split the Central Asian 
states prior to a consensus on forming a stronger economic union. 
In addition, a collective Central Asian compromise on the 
direction of foreign policy is necessary for future stability. 
Currently, the Tajiks demand the return of their cultural centers 
of Samarkand and Bukhara from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan had 
disputes with Uzbekistan over water rights, while Uzbekistan 
demands the return of the Uzbek-majority regions of Khodjent from 
Tajikistan and Osh .from Kyrgyzstan.  The borders established 
during the Stalin era are potential catalysts for future conflict 
at both a political and ethnic level. At present, there are 
estimated eighty potential border disputes simmering in the 
former Soviet Union. The mechanism needed for a possible 
resolution does not appear to be in any future compromises. 
The solution to a multi-dimensional foreign policy can only 
be achieved when the Central Asian states settle their myriad of 
inter-ethnic problems, border disputes, petroleum/exploratory 
rights, and appropriate infrastructure to exploit oil reserves. 
A large part of the problems stem from the utilization of 
minorities in one another■s territory in order to gain political 
advantage.  I am convinced the Central Asian people need 
assistance in democratic reform (e.g., empowerment through the 
ballot box). New policies for foreign and domestic reform cannot 
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take root until power-hungry leaders decentralize governmental 
power. National and regional security for this volatile region 
rests with the improved structure of economic union and political 
cohesion. The rational choices for self-determination and ethnic 
harmony play a tremendous role for the future prosperity of the 
Central Asian states.  The question of gaining petroleum 
independence along with indispensable oil export revenues will 
only be solved when the necessary foreign capital has been 
accessed through Western investment. This scenario depends 
greatly on the benefits and initiatives offered to foreign 
investment companies and the mutual cooperation with Moscow.  The 
dependency linkage between the Central Asian states and Russia is 
the main source of tension and will be the determining factor of 
future economic security. 
C.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE PETROLEUM POLICY IN 
BOLSTERING ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE 
As mentioned earlier, the lack of formal petroleum policy 
poses serious threats to the future economic security of the 
former Soviet Union. The oil industry depends on export capital 
for survival.  The aforementioned intrastate trade is only 
superficial for meeting the basic lower hierarchy of needs (e.g., 
fuel for heat, electricity, and transportation).  The survival of 
the oil-producing states relies on international exportation, 
investment of excess capital in pipeline infrastructure, and the 
replacement of antiquated petroleum equipment. 
Economic confidence will not be achieved until the financing 
of private oil firms can be accomplished by the companies 
64 
a t ti er e ntr l ental
er. ati l l ri l ti
it ru i lit l
esi . io l i f-determ i
m  rem eri
entr l si . st roleum
nd o it n s l i rt ill
l g it l
hro ester ent. i r
t efit ia iv g
n t pani utual erat it osc .
ink entr l si ussi
ai ill i
i rit .
. G FICA cr U
I I
s enti rli r, al oleum l
s t i ri
er viet ni n. il st s ort it l
r i al. e ent a l
erfi i l eeti si er i f . .,
l at, l tri it , ort ti ). i l f
-prod t l ortati ,
ent f s  it l  i l  t r , 
ace ent f t oleu  i ent. 
i f  ill t  i  ntil n
f r t  il rm   pli   panies 
themselves which includes the decreasing role of government 
subsidization, providing a legal framework for honoring contracts 
and settling intrastate and interstate disputes, the unilateral 
acceptance of a joint economic union between all states, 
introduction of a universal oil-pricing policy which allows the 
former Soviet states to compete on the international market, and 
ultimately stabilize and reverse the trend of decreasing oil 
production back to the 1988 levels (12.5 million barrels/day). 
According to Yergin and Gustaf son in Russia 2010: And What It 
Means for the World, the "drive for identity", a move by the 
independent oil states to place their state on the map as a 
significant oil producer, is the highest priority of the oil 
producing states. Without identity in the world market, the 
chances for survival within the Russian-dominated former Soviet 
Union are extremely limited by the decisions made in Moscow. The 
state of the Russian economy appears to be the driving force 
behind the rate of economic reform within the other independent 
states.  In other words, Russian motives within the free market 
society must be established prior to the stability of each 
independent state. 
According to the Oil and Gas Journal, four conditions are 
necessary in order to stabilize the Russian economy and the 
interstate/intrastate rivalries. The first is a political 
administration publicly elected with the legal groundwork for a 
justified division of power between president, parliament, and 
the judiciary. This system would be representative of all people 
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and empower the public in the state's destination.  The bottom 
line to this condition is forcing the government to accept the 
doctrine of laissez-faire and allow more latitude towards public 
interest. 
The second condition is the establishment of an economic 
community which favors a universal legal framework for handling 
state and international trade. According to A.E. Putilov, 
president of Rosneft, Russia's state oil enterprise, the crisis 
in the Russian oil industry can be overcome not so much by 
additional investment but by market relations. Many more 
guarantees for foreign investment are necessary but require the 
implementation of legislation (which is an extremely slow 
process). The legal framework must shape the industry before 
major changes can happen. 
The third condition is the complete revamping of the Russian 
oil industry.  This is a strategy endorsed by Oil and Gas 
Journal's David Khott who claims "the world oil industry's 
biggest challenge must be to reorganize Russia's oil sector"61. 
Since almost two-thirds of export revenues come from oil and gas, 
a loss of production or the inability to transport these 
hydrocarbon resources abroad translates into an automatic drop in 
foreign capital currently necessary for day-to-day operations. 
Reorganization of the oil sector is the most significant 
61David Khott, "Big Challenge: Reform Russia's Oil 
Industry", Oil & Gas Journal, August 8, 1994, p. 32. 
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condition necessary since state functions would nearly cease with 
the termination of oil flow. 
The fourth condition is the continuation of efforts to 
attract foreign capital and to draw back Russian funds secured in 
foreign banks also known as capital flight. Russia must help 
itself through promotion of domestic capital investment in 
private enterprises. This will only be possible through the 
prevention of domestic capital flows out of the state. 
Of all the conditions, why is the establishment of a stable 
petroleum policy the most critical element in bolstering economic 
security? The dependency on foreign revenues from oil is 
sufficient if considering a rentier state (one which derives the 
majority of its income from rents rather than the productive 
capacity of its citizens) but in the case of Russia, petroleum is 
only one of many production commodities. The other commodities 
would be competitive on the foreign market if they had the 
technology and mass production necessary for international 
competition. The answer to prosperity rests with the utilization 
of capital earned from oil revenues which must be reinvested for 
infrastructure (e.g., pipelines, roads, railways, revamped 
factories with Western technology, etc.).  If revenues are not 
reinvested into the economy along with the modernization of 
production equipment, the economy will continue to show 
disastrous setbacks62.  Once a petroleum policy can be 
620il & Gas Journal, "Russia's Oil and Gas Problems Continue 
to Ripple Through Economy", January 4, 1993, p. 32. 
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established which reflects the legal framework and political 
support from the entire bureaucracy, the groundwork shall be set 
to broaden markets and reinvest capital into a starving economy. 
The Russian economy would immensely benefit by emulating a 
rentier state but lacks the technology and infrastructure to 
exploit the vast natural resources hidden below the surface of 
both land and sea. The possibility of evenly distributing wealth 
thoughout all segments of the population (e.g., developing a much 
larger middle class society) could very well enhance the 
legitimacy of the Yeltsin administration and bolster the state of 
the federation.  If this was reality, the high capital available 
to the economy would require little to no taxation for 
developmental programs.  The available capital would allow 
Yeltsin to purchase an economic and political security system 
which could further enhance stability and legitimacy63.  Russia, 
however, does not have the means nor the desire to equally 
distribute state assets to the public.  For this reason, the 
impediments to privatization and capitalistic ventures can be 
directly related to the desire of the state to control capital 
investment and ultimately the oil industry. 
D.  OIL CONTROL:  WHAT IT MEANS FOR RUSSIA AND THE INDEPENDENT 
STATES 
What is meant by oil control? Oil and gas are valuable 
commodities which can afford a more stable economic lifestyle for 
those states which can produce and market such resources on a 
"Robert W. Stookey ed., The Arabian Peninsula, Zone in 
Ferment (Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 25. 
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grand scale. The control of oil involves who owns the reserves, 
who owns the right to market the reserves, who receives the 
revenues, and who has the contract to develop the oil fields. 
Control is directly related to the right to legally or wantonly 
exploit the oil or gas for financial gain. The reasons for 
desiring control may be different for each party participating in 
the conquest, but the ultimate goal is potential economic gains. 
This is evident to all the private oil companies which rely 
upon one product for survivability. The goal for individual 
states may differ with respect to control. The United States for 
instance desires a majority of domestic consumption to be 
supplied by domestic production. In addition, the U.S. cannot 
afford to depend upon foreign oil as a major source of its oil 
without introducing assurance guarantees which will protect the 
national interest. The Gulf War is evidence of that desire to 
permit the flow of oil out of the Middle East. Economic warfare 
such as the Arab oil embargo of 1973 exemplifies the significance 
of the ability by certain countries to restrict the flow of oil 
and control the oil weapon64. 
Russia, on the other hand, desires to control not only the 
production and distribution of its domestic oil but also the oil 
of the former republics65. The Russian invasion of Chechnya is 
64Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, 
and Power (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 631. 
65Stephen J. Blank, "Energy and Security in Transcaucasia", 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 7, 
1994, p. 2. 
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not an isolated instance of repression for the intention of 
maintaining the Russian Federation, but instead a wielding of 
power to control the access to oil flowing out of the Caucasus 
through Grozny and ultimately Moscow.  President Yeltsin claims 
the goal in Grozny is "to restore constitutional order" which is 
the job of the counterintelligence service (successor to the KGB 
Second Directorate), but in reality, the counterintelligence 
service job description of "defending the constitution" has long 
been a euphemism for police suppression of political dissent. 
The war on Grozny "serves the Yeltsin administration by giving a 
message to other non-Russian ethnic groups, including those of 
the newly independent states" (especially the ones with 
independent oil interests) "that Moscow will not hesitate to use 
violence in the face of recalcitrance"66.  The situation almost 
exhibits signs of former communist xenophobic practices.  This 
contentious situation is difficult to predict for future 
implications, but one thing is for certain: where oil and gas 
are involved within the confines of the FSU borders, the battle 
for control or influence of these resources will not be easily 
attained without the use of force, threats, or economic leverage. 
The control over oil and gas resources is the most potent 
leverage available to Russia in order to carry out its national 
interests.  Military force, unlike that under Soviet control, can 
66Amy Knight, "The Real Winner in Chechnya:  The K.G.B.", 
The New York Times, February 2, 1995, p. A-17. 
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no longer be justified for intervention in intrastate conflict . 
Russia has been able to advance its own economic security 
interests under the auspices of peacekeeping activities in 
regions of internal conflict (e.g., Tajikistan, South Ossetia, 
Moldova, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh). The new role for Russia 
as the successor to the Soviet Union allows government officials 
to do little to disguise Russia's less than neutral intentions in 
the near abroad68. This is not unusual when considering that 
many Russian officials in the military consider the former Soviet 
borders to coincide with those of .Russia. 
Moscow has asserted its control by ensuring that states such 
as Azerbaidzhan and Kazhakstan cannot transport oil without 
utilizing the vast network of Russian pipelines. Without 
Moscow's permission for building new non-Russian pipelines across 
any Russian territory, the respective independent states must 
sign a contract granting a certain percentage of all revenues be 
67The Soviet Union could justify intervention within the 
republics when they were part of the union, but today discretion 
of the international arena must be contemplated with respect to 
possible sanctions.  Peacekeeping forces became the avenue the 
Russians forces would exploit in order to express its new form of 
control. This was the most opportunistic way for Russia to 
implant occupation forces, with the lack of a U.N. Security 
Council directive in place within the FSU, Russia could carry out 
operations as desired. 
68See paper written by Dr. Elaine M. Holoboff for the 
Conference on Multilateral Security: Eurasia and the West 
sponsored by the Russian Littoral Project, Kings College, London 
and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, October, 
1994, p. 8. 
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sent to Moscow69.  Russia's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh war 
is now changing (toward an Azeri solution) due to the desire to 
ensure a new pipeline structure is built in their favor (vice a 
Turkey or Iran pipeline structure)70.  The trend appears to be 
that Moscow will utilize any political weapon within its arsenal 
in order to exploit the vast reserves of oil outside the Russian 
borders. 
Another example of the economic power of oil is the 
petroleum dependency of Ukraine on Russian oil.  In the spring of 
1994, Kiev owed Moscow $3.2 billion for oil and gas imports. 
Moscow threatened to shut down oil deliveries as a threat to gain 
a strategic position of economic power over Kiev's dependent 
economy. A prime example of Moscow's subversive attempt to gain 
a dominant position over Kiev occurred in June of 1993: 
President Yeltsin decided to play the   'oil card'  in 
order to obtain concessions on the Black Sea Fleet; 
subsequently after numerous threats,  Moscow shut off 
oil and gas supplies for several days71. 
The same action was taken against Belarus in 1993 for failure to 
pay gas debts. 
69
 e.g., Moscow coerced Azerbaidzhan into a 10 percent share 
of oil revenues due to the control wielded over the Azeri 
pipelines through disposition of its petroleum at terminal points 
in Russia. 
70See "No Way Out", The Economist. May 28, 1994, pp. 92-93. 
A new pipeline is being considered for an outlet to the West via 
the Black Sea.  Turkey and Iran each have separate solutions for 
a pipeline to pass through their territories which would 
inevitably give them an upper hand in the regional petroleum • 
business. 
71
 "Out of Gas", The Economist. March 12, 1994, p. 291 
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Russia has the way and the means to subvert most of the 
independent states.  Should it be any surprise that Moscow is 
using Soviet tactics to coerce an economic union of the FSU under 
Russian control? From the evidence presented, a common economic 
union would most likely benefit most of the independent states 
and foster a better environment for capitalist ventures, but the 
sole concern for the independent states is the manifestation of 
sovereign ideals and the removal of Moscow's influence. Power- 
politics will be the name of the game for the near future. 
Unlike under communism, the former republics do have alternative 
sources of assistance outside of Russia.  The independent states 
will only gain power and economic influence by bolstering 
intrastate and interstate trade through taking advantage of their 
resources available and gaining Western capital investment for 
infrastructure and technology. Oil is that commodity which will 
attract Western investment and bolster economic confidence. 
The oil and gas business is no longer a regional business 
and takes on a global perspective which affects all countries 
that produce or consume petroleum products.  Oil and gas have a 
greater impact on national security than any other global 
commodity. The Persian Gulf War illustrates the essential 
position of oil in the global balance of power.  The position of 
FSU oil within the realm of the world economy has not yet been 
contemplated with respect to its significance and its position 
within this balance of power. What if the former Soviet 
republics collectively decided to suspend all petroleum 
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exports? The result would be a modest decrease to world 
petroleum supplies but a devastating effect on the economies of 
the independent states.  This scenario is not very realistic but 
the implications are quite apparent.  The decrease in FSU 
petroleum production which has been cut in half from the levels 
of 1988 is an omen to the fate of the petroleum industry.  If 
steps are not taken to preclude a massive collapse of this 
industry, the result may be a massive security issue for the 
entire world. 
The last decline (prior to 1989) of Soviet oil production 
occurred during the mid 1980's and resulted with a substantial 
infusion of capital from the central government.  Internal 
funding is no longer available.  Solid increases of investment 
are necessary to alleviate the problems facing the FSU petroleum 
sector. Russia must be the focal point for modifications. 
Moscow influences the disposition of over 85 percent of all oil 
and gas produced in the FSU72.  The independent states must be 
included in the solution, but their political and economic 
weakness prevent the introduction of true reform.  Besides, the 
United States and its allies have given the Yeltsin 
administration the sole attention for initiating reform policies. 
Meaningful Russian economic reforms73, political stability74, 
72T David Yergm and Joseph Stanislaw, "Oil: Reopening the 
Door", Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, Number 4, September/October 
1993, p. 86. 
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and a reliable legal framework for trade and investment75 are 
prerequisites to Western investment in the Russian oil sector. 
Russia currently lacks a market pricing system. The 
government pays oil producing amalgamations around 28 cents per 
barrel of oil produced76. This extremely low price creates 
serious problems for the petroleum sector due to the inability to 
pay competitive wages for workers and capacity to buy spare parts 
and necessary upgrades. Inflated prices for petroleum are passed 
on to the consumer who is probably just as poor as the state. 
This "catch 22" situation requires innovative solutions. 
Only the West is capable of providing the necessary capital and 
technology to initiate a solution. This requires a modest 
relaxation of political and economic barriers to investment77. 
Investment will spawn better oil prices due to a much improved 
infrastructure.  The increase of national oil prices and workers' 
wages will augment the money in circulation and bolster public 
confidence.  Spending will inevitably increase and the oil 
industry will be the major benefactor. 
e.g., issuing presidential decrees which promote 
capitalistic growth such as rewards and tax incentives for 
private industrial investment and entrepreneurship; and eliminate 
decrees which are primarily graft. 
76
"Soviet Oil and World Prices", Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, House of Representatives, December 11, 1991, p. 16. 
77r 
Tax codes must be changed to help attract more 
transnational oil companies. Revenue sharing must reflect a more 
impartial_split of windfall.  Political barriers such as 
presidential decrees in effect which place many restrictions on 
foreign companies must be relaxed. 
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The FSU estimated oil reserves are considered to be 
comparable to those of the Middle East.  In order to exploit 
these vast reserves, foreign investment could make a very 
significant difference.  It is estimated that $50 billion is 
necessary between now and the year 2000 in order to stabilize 
Russian oil production at its current levels (6.5 million 
barrels/day)78.  The possibility for oil production to fall below 
4 million barrels per day is possible if foreign investment is 
not sought.  This would be disastrous for the Russian economy. 
In order to revert production back to the levels of the late 
1980's, it is estimated another $50 to $70 billion dollars of 
investment is required;  Russia does not nearly have the 
resources available to cover such a heavy burden79.  For this 
reason, foreign investment from Western oil companies and 
governments is essential for economic recovery and bolstering 
public confidence. 
Russia craves foreign investment but is hampered by the 
opposition by many Yeltsin supporters who despise the thought of 
depending upon the support of a former adversary. Many Russians 
only desire Western influence on their own terms.  If this is the 
ideology of the Russian bureaucracy, transnational oil companies 
will take their business elsewhere such as the highly promising 
78Ian F. Elliot, The Soviet Energy Balance (New York: 
Praeger, 1993) p. 72. 
V9T 9Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, "Oil: Reopening the 
Door", Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, Number 4, September/October 
1993, p. 87. 
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reserves of the newly independent states of Azerbaidzhan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (which is already the case for 
Chevron and Amoco oil companies). Tensions could grow 
exponentially between Russia, the independent states, and the 
Western consortiums. This provocative situation could eventually 
involve Western security institutions (e.g.,  CSCE, UN). The 
bottom line is each party must make concessions in order to 
promote the interests of all parties. Cooperation through 
international negotiation and multilateral contracts will be the 
only way to foster an environment of esprit de corps. 
Russia will be able to bolster economic confidence provided 
the petroleum sector is singled out as a major component of 
future economic security. The risks involved for Western 
investment in the petroleum sector are high, but the potential 
returns far outweigh these risks. With supplemental insurance 
guarantees granted to the transnational oil companies, the rate 
of investment will grow in time. The future beholds a massive 
fortune for those who take the risk and invest in the future 
stability of the Russian petroleum sector. 
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IV.  UNITED STATES' NATIONAL INTEREST WITH RESPECT TO 
RUSSIAN PETROLEUM PROSPECTS 
A.  THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN FORMULATING UNITED STATES' ENERGY 
POLICY 
Since the oil shock of 1973, most industrialized nations 
have come to accept energy security and economic security as key 
components of national security. Daniel Yergin, author of The 
Prize,   suggests that "the objective of energy security is to 
assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices 
and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and 
objectives"80. These supplies that Yergin refers to have for the 
first time in history dropped below fifty percent from domestic 
production.  Consequently, the United States now depends more on 
foreign oil than can realistically be supplied by domestic 
producers. 
From a historical view point, the United States during the 
1950's produced roughly half of the total world's oil. This is 
twice as much oil as the Middle Eastern and North African oil 
states produced in combination. By the late 1960's, the U.S. 
surplus production had disappeared, and between 1967 and 1973, 
oil imports rose from 19 percent to 36 percent of total U.S. oil 
consumption. The U.S. production figures have decreased by 
almost 50 percent since 1967, while consumpution figures have 
consistently increased from 1.5 to 2.0 percent annually.  James 
Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1972, 
80Daniel Yergin, "Energy Security in the 1990's" Foreign 
Affairs. Volume 67 (Fall 1988) , p. 111. 
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demanded the promotion of energy conservation for reasons of 
national security, and environmental improvement, but few people 
were convinced of an impending crisis81. Within a year, the Arab 
oil embargo would magnify the significance of a desperately- 
needed national energy policy in order to protect U.S. national 
interests. 
The result of this national energy challenge was the 
establishment in 1975 of fuel efficiency standards and the 100 
percent enlargement of strategic petroleum reserves.  In April 
1977, President Carter stated: 
Our decision about energy will  test the character of 
the merican people and the ability of the President and 
Congress to govern  the nation.     This difficult effort 
will be the moral  equivalent of war,   except that we 
will be uniting our efforts to build and not destroy82. 
As we observe today, the policies placed forth at this time (ie. 
reducing imports by eliminating price controls on U.S. domestic 
oil and promoting energy conservation) have not thoroughly been 
supported by members of Congress and the President due to the 
absence of impending crisis or lack of willpower. 
In 1980, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was 
established as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and to enhance the military contribution to energy security with 
respect to maintaining open shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. 
The Defense Department Report for fiscal year 1981 sums this up 
8 IT Daniel Yergin, The Prize:  The Epic Quest for Money, Oil, 
and Power (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 567 
82Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 38. 
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very well: 
With time and a reduction in our standard of living,  we 
could forgo or substitute for much of what we import. 
But any major interruption of this flow of goods and 
services could have the most serious near-term effects 
on the U.S.   economy.     In no respect is that more 
evident than in the case of oil.    A large scale 
disruption in the supply of foreign oil could have 
damaging consequences for the United States as the loss 
of an important military campaign,  or indeed a war. 
Such a disruption could be almost fatal  to some of our 
allies.     It is little wonder,   in these circumstances, 
that access to foreign oil constitutes a critical 
condition of U.S.  security33. 
Due to projects aimed at energy efficiency during the Carter 
administration, the U.S. was able to save 13 million barrels of 
oil per day ($150 billion savings/year) by the mid-1980's. Oil 
imports in 1977 constituted 46 percent of total U.S. consumption. 
This figure dropped to 28 percent by 1982. The energy policies 
in place during the Carter years were almost reversed 180 degrees 
during the Reagan administration due to the abundancy and 
relative inexpensive petroleum during the 1980's.  Federal 
funding for energy conservation was cut back by 70 percent, and 
funding for solar and other renewable forms of energy was cut by 
80 percent. These cutbacks stemmed mainly from the desire for 
private industry to thrive without added precautions and internal 
overhead costs.  By 1990, oil imports had increased from 28 
percent to almost 50 percent which accounts for almost half of 
our $100 billion trade deficit84. These is significant since our 
national debt, hyper-inflated spending, and lack of cash flow 
83Romm,   pp.   38-39. 
84Romm,   p.   40. 
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from the internal markets could eventually create a severe 
recession.  The military energy program, which entailed spending 
billions of dollars each year to protect the flow of oil was kept 
intact by reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers and providing a naval 
presence in the Persian Gulf as a strategic measure of our 
support for this region85. 
The short duration of an energy concern during the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait (oil shot above $40 per barrel on the 
internationl market) did not seem to warrant a higher profile on 
energy policy following the Iraqi War.  This would appear to be 
the same hypocrisy practiced by past administrations.  The 
concern of the Bush administration was real but consequential 
action was soon dismissed due to domestic economic problems. I 
believe this inaction inevitablity became a major mistake. At 
the time of the gulf crisis, President Bush made the following 
statement: 
Our jobs,   our way of life,   our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would 
all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein" and "we cannot 
allow any tyrant to practice economic blackmail. 
Energy security is national security,   and we must be 
prepared to act accordingly36. 
The United States, like most industrialized states does not 
contemplate an energy crisis unless one is imminent, or it 
threatens our national security.  Joseph Romm states the 
85Daniel Yergin, The Prize:  The Epic Quest for Money, Oil, 
and Power (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 765-766.' 
860uoted from "Bush Says Iraqi Aggression Threatens Our Way 
of Life", New York Times, August 16, 1990, p. A-4. 
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underlining problem quite succinctly in his book Defining 
National Security:    new threats to U.S. national security- 
including nonmilitary matters such as economy, energy, the 
environment, and drugs, are not adequately addressed by America's 
existing security paradigm. Romm suggests that the term 
"national security" be redefined for the post-Cold War era. 
Many economists agree that political considerations are 
frequently a barrier to rational energy policy. The problem 
stems from reactive policy by Congress and the President. They 
appear to be driven to action by catastrophic events and the 
media attention of those events87. This is evident by the 
previous quote of George Bush concerning energy security as 
synonymous with national security during the Gulf War. 
Prior to 1970, U.S. "national security" referred almost 
exclusively to military security. The primary threat was from 
"external threats to the American way of life". The spread of 
communism and its threat to democratic idealism would be the 
major component to jeopardize national and international 
freedoms.  In 1947, when the National Security Act established 
the National Security Council, the function of this body of 
government was stated as follows:  "to advise the president with 
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military 
policies relating to national security"88. The definition of 
87Conaress and the Nation, Volume VIII, pp. 417-495. 
88Quoted from Joseph J. Romm, The Once and Future Superpower 
(New York: William and Morrow and Co., Inc., 1992), p. 42. 
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national security was purposely left open ended in order to 
accommodate new threats to our national security. According to 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1947, the goal of national 
security policy might be military in nature (containment of the 
Soviet Union) but the means would include numerous nonmilitary 
measures89. By the late 194O's, economic measures would be the 
main weapon to enforce a policy of containment with a simple but 
effective nuclear arsenal as the primary deterrent90. This came 
in the form of the Marshall Plan, a foreign aid program for 
rebuilding Europe after World War II aimed at thwarting the 
spread of communism. The United States also used export controls 
via a committee with NATO allies called CoCom, Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls.  This organization was 
established to restrict exports of sensitive technology to the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. At this time the threat 
from the USSR was top priority, so economic security was taken 
for granted and the policy of containment would drive our 
national security policy for the next forty years91.  The energy 
crisis of 1973 would be the first time the U.S. national security 
would be threatened at home by an economic war waged by the oil- 
producing states of the Middle East.  Fortunately, the threat 
89Romm, p. 43. 
90The historian John Lewis Gaddis expresses the U.S. 
government "decides to rely on economic rather than military 
instruments of containment in the late 1940's".  "American 
Historical Review Forum", April 1984, p. 383. 
91Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez-Faire (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 1991) pp. 197-209. 
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from the Arab oil embargo was not as damaging as was originally 
believed, but the U.S. realized the extent of its vulnerability 
with respect to a lack of unlimited oil supply. Dependency on 
oil was not a position that the U.S. could afford while still 
competing with the Soviet Union for world influence. 
By 1975, the U.S. Congress would heed the words mentioned 
earlier by James Schlesinger and produced a similar response: 
the urgency of the nation's energy challenge will 
require commitments similar to those undertaken in the 
Manhattan and Apollo projects92. 
When President Ronald Reagan took the helm in 1981, the 
nonmilitary energy policy was eliminated and environmental 
regulations were relaxed.  Energy security from this point 
diminished as our dependence on foreign oil increased. Economic, 
energy, and environmental security suffered throughout the 1980's 
at the expense of military security. The policies of this era 
were quick fixes and lacked any directional thought for the 
future. The need for a focused national security policy was 
replaced by whims and zealous governmental spending. 
With the end of the Cold War, a new era is dawning upon U.S. 
security concerns. The military threat has transformed into a 
greater economic threat involving the dependency on foreign 
petroleum and the inability to control the rate of energy 
conservation domestically. The Persian Gulf War explains a great 
deal concerning the threat of OECD countries (except for U.S. and 
920uoted in Ralph Cavanagh, "National Energy Policy", World 
Policy Journal, Spring 1989, p. 242. 
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Canada) relying upon one region for indispensable oil imports. 
Geo-economic power is becoming the strategic advantage over the 
dying competitiveness of geo-strategic military power.  Since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the meaning of national security has 
hopefully inaugurated a quest for a new stable world order.  For 
instance in 1991, Theodore Moran, director of the Program in 
International Business Diplomacy at Georgetown University's 
School of Foreign Service, listed six primary areas for U.S. 
National Security Policy in the 1990's. They are as follows: 
Encouraging stability and reform in the Soviet Union" 
(my first premise for Russian economic security through 
oil and gas policy reform) , "maintaining a cooperative 
U.S.-Japanese relationship,  avoiding vulnerabilities from the globalization of America's defense industrial 
base,  reducing dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf" 
(my second premise which consists of augmenting U.S. 
oil imports by exploiting the vast explored and 
unexplored oil reserves in Russia) , "moderating the 
Impact on the Third World of the prolonged debt crisis, 
and limiting the damage from narcotics trade93. 
These areas of concern are not all inclusive, but they cover the 
primary basis for security policy to be formulated.  This brings 
us to the question of how the U.S. Congress can formulate energy 
policy and what are the conditions necessary to persuade Congress 
to acquiesce and implement a comprehensive policy which satisfies 
national security into the next century? 
The special relationship between the oil industry 
constituency and Congress through the past fifty years has been 
very profitable for the oil companies due to the oil depletion 
93Quoted from Theodore Moran, "International Economics and 
National Security", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/91, p. 74. 
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allowance established in 1950. The allowance permits oil 
producers to deduct up to 27.50 percent (22 percent since 1969) 
of their gross income prior to subtracting other deductions in 
computing their taxable income. The rationale for this exemption 
is that as the supply is used up, oil becomes more scarce and 
much more difficult to discover and develop.  The depletion 
allowance is surmised to be an incentive to encourage new 
exploration. The actual success of the oil interest group will 
be analyzed here in order to measure the impact of interest 
aggregation vis-a-vis the policy area. A comprehensive insight 
into the oil industry's political antics will be focused upon for 
a cross-sectional view of the possible support within Congress 
for energy policy reform. 
Although the oil industry has gained financially in the last 
fifty years, the oil industries have lost congressional support 
consistently from the end of World War II up to 1990.  The policy 
issues initiated by President Truman (e.g., to reduce drastically 
the oil depletion allowance) was the first attack to reduce the 
influence of "petro-politics" within congress94.  From this 
point, the executive branch from each consecutive administration 
would attack the special incentives for oil exploration. 
Up to the present day, the incentives have diminished (e.g., oil 
depletion allowance, development of alternative fuel sources, and 
fewer tax breaks for environmental safety developments) while 
94T Bruce Ian Oppenheimer, Oil and the Congressional Process 
(Lexington, MA:  Lexington Books, 1974), p. 27. 
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restrictions have increased dramatically (e.g., environmental 
standards and restrictions on locations of drilling and 
exploration).  The result of these policy changes has placed the 
oil industry in a detrimental position for future prosperity. 
U.S. economic security has benefited since the oil industry's 
move to exploit foreign reserves (posing fewer restrictions and a 
much higher financial gain). 
The constituent strength of the oil industry must be 
examined in the House and Senate in order to grasp the influence 
of this particular interest group.  Both houses of Congress are 
neither the first nor the last point in the decision making 
process, but their high visibility places them at the forefront 
of political change.  Initially, the Operationalizing of oil 
interests within Congress with their constituencies must be 
scrutinized. 
A total of thirty-three states produce oil or oil products, 
but fifteen of these states produce 97.50 percent of the total 
U.S. domestic production95.  These states are the only states 
with significant oil interest within the congressional process. 
Of these fifteen states, we can legitimately conclude that at 
least thirty senators have oil interests in their constituency. 
Including the Senate and House of Representatives, there are 
approximately 84 votes in favor of oil constituents; this 
interest is equal to about 25-30 percent of the membership.  From 
95l|r 
"The Oil Producing Industry in Your State", Independent 
Petroleum Association of America, 1989, p. 18. 
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these figures, we can deduct that a minority of less than one- 
third of congressional membership has an interest in the oil- 
industry constituency.  In other words, any legislation which 
benefits the oil constituents would have approximately 25-30 
percent support in both houses. The following is provided in 
order to operationalize the definition of a constituency 
petroleum interest:  (provided from the Mineral Yearbook 1966) 
Districts were considered to have a petroleum interest 
if  (1)   the value of petroleum produced in that district 
exceeded five million dollars;   (2)   two million barrels 
or more of crude petroleum were produced;  or  (3)   the 
Yearbook credited the county with active exploration96 
The figures here are arbitrary but the generalization gives 
evidence of a constituency support for oil industry to be much 
less than the majority rule for passing legislation.  It must 
also be taken in consideration that the top four oil producing 
states account for over 76 percent of total domestic production 
(this would include over 82 percent including the current Alaskan 
oil production).  If these figures are utilized for estimating 
congressional oil interests, then only 8 percent of the Senate 
and 13 percent of the House would share an interest in oil 
production legislation. The oil industry has had constituency- 
related ties of 25-30 percent of the House and Senate membership 
which is far from enough strength to win floor votes unless a 
large percentage of the other members are absent or can be 
persuaded to vote for the maintenance of oil industry incentives 
96Quoted from Bruce Ian Oppenheimer, Oil and the 
Congressional Process (Lexington, MA; Lexington Books, 1974), p. 
19. 
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(e.g., the oil depletion allowance)97. This brings us to the 
question of where has the support come from and why has that 
influence been bolstered drastically since 1990? 
The increasing support of the oil industry can be attributed 
to two major events:  (1) the first time in U.S. history where 
domestic oil production accounts for less than 50% of total 
petroleum consumption (directly related to U.S. dependency on 
foreign oil imports); and (2) oil companies are forced to shut 
down production and forestall exploration when price controls are 
not instituted by the federal government.  When oil production 
decreases as much as it has in the U.S. since 1989 (25% total to 
date)98, the government and national security suffer also.  The 
government does not collect taxes or royalties on revenues, rents 
and bonuses from federal acreages, and corporate taxes from 
bankrupt companies.  The higher taxes paid by oil companies due 
to a lower oil depletion allowance is the prime demotivator for 
revitalized exploration and investment in transnational oil 
ventures.  Meantime in March 1994, the U.S. Senate energy 
committee reported a modest U.S. oil industry relief bill which 
would provide producers a royalty holiday for new deep water 
production until the capital costs are recovered. This amended 
the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (OPA) helping independent producers 
operate offshore by certifying $150 million financial 
97Cppenheimer, p. 20. 
98Patrick Crow, "Efforts to Assist Domestic Oil Producers", 
The Oil and Gas Journal, Volume 92, Number 9, February 28, 1994, 
p. 23. 
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responsibility by the federal government and allowing the 
reduction of OPA's requirement for financial responsibility based 
on the risk of oil spills". 
The U.S. oil and gas industry is making political progress 
and congressional sympathy for slumping oil prices and.decreasing 
production. The industry's main focus has been tax relief and 
not price support. The Oil and Gas Journal commends this 
strategy since their view is that price support will never occur 
in the U.S.; and besides, low oil prices help more voters than 
they harm100.  In February 1994, 34 oil-producing state senators 
and representatives met to discuss ways to assist producers. The 
discussion focused .on tax relief for marginal production. 
Further legislative process will depend on the industry's ability 
to persuade the House and Senate members of an impending crisis. 
Producers must pursue relief in the context of immediate national 
concerns:  jobs, economic activity, federal revenues, national 
economic security, and dependence on foreign oil.  Success at the 
level of practical politics will advance the deeper message by 
the following implication: national interests are linked with 
the ability to produce oil and gas. With the help of President 
Clinton, emergency legislation could pass this year but not 
comprehensive tax relief legislation. According to former 
Senator David Boren (D-Okla.) architect of the "Energy Summit", 
""U.S. Senate Energy Committee Reports Out a Modest Oil 
Industry Relief Bill", The Oil and Gas Journal. Volume 92, Number 
11, March 14, 1994, p. 2. 
100The Oil and Gas Journal, December 17, 1994, p. 21. 
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oil production has declined 25% in the last five years; 
the oil industry is in a free fall where emergency 
assistance is justified,  just as it was for a natural 
disaster in the California earthquake   (1994) .     One of 
our problems is that this is not an issue except in 
Texas,  Louisiana and Oklahoma,   I don't think the rest 
of the country realizes there is a problem101. 
Many oil-state members of Congress have pointed out that 
real crude oil prices have fallen to the lowest point in twenty 
years, but most others see this as an added incentive for 
consumers and constituents. The time has come for Congress and 
the current administration to put forth a domestic energy policy 
which recognizes the national security interest and the inherent 
problems of our domestic energy industry.  This would also 
include a policy which places the U.S. in a more favorable 
position to help ease global dependence on imports of Middle 
Eastern oil. A major step towards accomplishing such a goal 
would be to extend technical assistance to help restore Russian 
oil production which would expedite economic recovery. 
Fortunately, the U.S. Congress is in the process of contemplating 
FSU foreign assistance with respect to the energy sector. 
Twenty-one members of the House of Representatives have formed a 
caucus, the Congressional Institute, to promote energy trade 
between the U.S. and the CIS.  The caucus is compelling the 
government to devise a strategy for more effectively penetrating 
the former Soviet Union energy market.  Congress must ponder the 
101Quoted from Patrick Crow, "Efforts to Assist Domestic Oil 
Producers", The Oil and Gas Journal, Volume 92, Number 9, 
February 28, 1994, p. 23. 
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significance of CIS crude in order to define the future of U.S. 
national interest. Representative Greg Laughlin addresses this 
topic quite approprately in a speech to the International Trade 
Commission (ITC), 
Energy holds the key to successful transformation of 
the FSU from a socialist to a free market economy;  the 
development and export of FSU oil and gas is in the 
U.S.  interest because it will ease world dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil102. 
This brings us to another question: what will the role of 
Russian (and FSU) oil be in defining U.S. national interest? 
B.  THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN OIL IN DEFINING UNITED STATES' 
NATIONAL INTEREST 
Before the actual role of Russian oil can be contemplated, 
the significance of foreign oil must be established relevant to 
the United States national interest. While the U.S. represents 
just 5 percent of the world's population, it consumes almost 30 
percent of the world's oil103. The U.S. also imports just over 50 
percent of its current oil needs, and domestic reserves now 
account for less than 2.5 percent of the world's proven reserves. 
Russia, on the other hand, has almost 6 percent of world proven 
reserves and astronomical unproven reserves104.  The USSR would 
never have been able to attain its superpower status without the 
development of its immense oil and gas complex. After the 
development of the West Siberian oil and gas, the USSR oil 
102Crow, p. 46. 
103Phil Kuntz, "Unstable Mideast Oil Supply Rocks the World 
Market, Congressional Quarterly. January 5, 1991, p. 21. 
104National Petroleum News, June 1993, p. 21. 
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production doubled between 1971 and 1988; gas production 
increased by more than 7.5 fold; this accounts for almost 20 
percent of world production of oil and 40 percent of the world 
production of gas (1988 figures). At this time, the Soviet Union 
was the number one oil and gas producing country (OPEC produces 
much more oil but not when divided by individual countries). 
This should give a clear perspective of the undeniable potential 
of vast Russian oil and gas reserves. 
Now on the darker side, Russia is battling a severe economic 
crisis which includes:  a drop in industrial production by a 
factor of two, the cleavage of economic relations between CIS 
countries, the loss of the regulatory role of the state in the 
economy, and a decay of the geological service105. All of these 
occurrences have caused a sharp decline in the production and 
consumption of oil and gas since the demise of the Soviet Union 
(from 12.5 million barrels/day in 1988 to 7.0 million barrels/day 
in 1994).  To date, all economic reform directed at the oil and 
gas industry has failed and requires technological assistance and 
capital only possible through Western investment or capital 
reinvested from within the former Soviet Union106.  The latter is 
not possible without oil export revenues which are dimishing on a 
105
"Oil Export Policies Threaten Future Economic 
Development", FBIS-USR-94-050, Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 
19, 1994, pp. 4 and 42. 
106Currently the available capital from within Russia is not 
available. Much of the revenue from oil is lost through "capital 
flight".  This money is basically worthless while standing idle 
in Swiss banks and other reputable Western banks. 
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daily basis. 
Oil can be viewed today as a single global market where 
production deviation can have a colossal effect on prices and 
availability. When the prices rise in one region of the world, 
the price will also increase across the globe.  It really does 
not matter where the oil originates or how much is imported. The 
amount of oil controlled by the originator (exporter) is the 
bottom line indicator for controlling the price. This was a 
factor in the 1973 Arab oil embargo and more recently when the 
price of crude oil vaulted from 20 dollars per barrel to just 
over 40 dollars per barrel after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The national security of the United States currently depends 
a great deal on the volatile regions (with respect to open sea 
lanes) of the Middle East, the former Soviet Union (with respect 
to oil dependency), and the possibility for exploitation of the 
latter's inability to promote energy reform. The Middle East, 
besides bearing a heavy cost to the U.S. in foreign aid and 
military security through Persian Gulf naval forces, is 
developing an upper hand on the increased U.S. dependency on OPEC 
oil (U.S. receives 50 percent of imported petroleum from the 
Middle East).  For this reason, any financial advisor in his 
right mind would suggest that the United States either diversify 
its dependence on foreign oil or drastically reduce domestic 
consumption which is not very likely with an annual increase of 
almost 2 percent. Energy needs, oil dependency, and the fragile 
.economic balance of price controls, present intricate global 
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issues.  The threat from oil dependency to U.S. national security 
may not appear to be an imminent crisis to most members of the 
U.S. Congress, but certain indicators (such as oil import figures 
and domestic production and consumption) should raise a flag to 
the immediate economic consequences.  The changing nature of the 
oil threat tenders U.S. national security challenges which are 
not always apparent to those caught up in domestic legislation. 
The National Energy Strategy enacted in 1991 by the Bush 
administration was primarily aimed at reducing the U.S. 
dependency on Middle East reserves107.  This policy met the 
perceived threat of oil dependency, but the policy inaction 
(e.g.,  major conservation acts) was only ideas which never 
became reality.  Since the reduction of U.S. petroleum 
consumption does not appear to be in the cards any time in the 
near future and dependency on foreign oil is a reality in 1995, 
diversification of oil imports will be an essential policy 
consideration within the next few years.  This is why the need to 
build up the oil industry (with guaranteed dividends) within the 
former Soviet Union is of a critical nature to the national 
security interests of the United States.  For this reason, 
economic security is becoming much more significant than the once 
formidable military doctrine necessary for countering the Soviet 
arsenal and containing the spread of communism. 
107 ||r 
"The National Energy Strategy", Hearing before U.S. House 
of Representatives, 102nd Congress, First Session, October 16, 
1991, p. 7. 
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Congress is currently debating the key emphasis for energy 
security. One viewpoint sides with the National Energy Strategy, 
which favors continuing the supply-side approach108 to energy 
strategy (including the military energy policy) , and the other 
viewpoint stresses energy security strategy that includes a 
strong nonmilitary component based on demand reduction109. The 
Russian option (where the U.S. provides foreign aid, technology, 
and transnational oil exploitation) along with additional 
conservation policies provide the most pragmatic solution to the 
energy security problem. The answer may appear simple but the 
process of capitalizing upon this solution will be an extensive 
task. 
In order to take advantage of the massive Russian petroleum 
prospects, the United States does not have the pleasure to wait 
out the Russian political scene for stability. Whoever is 
sitting in the Russian or independent states' presidential seat 
does not really matter.  We should be dealing directly with the 
position and not the person in that position. Now is the time to 
invest in the Russian (and CIS) oil and gas sector while it is 
still in a vulnerable position.  If the opportunity is not taken, 
108Supply-side approach means the U.S. will be forced to 
produce a larger percentage of its domestic supplies while 
decreasing dependency on foreign oil which is almost impossible 
with the current consumption rate increasing by 2 percent each 
year. 
109Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) p. 42. 
97 
ongres r t at phasi
rit . poi t it ati al er t ,
hi r t l -  
rateg n u ili li ), r
poi t ri rateg t
ro ilit ponent t .
ussi t er . . i , e l ,
ra t l il l it t ) it it l
s r at li i i ost ati
ri . er a r l t
it n ill t
.
r t assi ussi roleum
s ects, nit t t t ait
t ussi lit l ili . hoever
tin ussi n e t t s' r i nti l t
t l a ter. e l l i t it
si t t sit . im
st ussi I ) il t r hil
l r l sit . ort nit t ,
l08Su ply-si ea . . ill
t esti pli hil
il hi ost possi l
it r t pti r t
ar.
l09Jos . , efi ati al curit N ork:
ouncil r el t r ss, ) . .
there are many more countries who will jump at the chance to 
capitalize on a high risk/very high return venture. 
The other disastrous and harmful situation for the West 
would be the consolidation of Russian (and FSU) and OPEC 
petroleum into an oligopoly which would be more powerful and 
dangerous than a military and economic superpower like the United 
States. This situation is not totally preposterous when 
considering a statement made by Victor Chernomyrdin in January 
1994 where he announced Russia's interest in joining OPEC, only 
to retract the statement at a later date. Russia would rather 
wait until all oil in the FSU is consolidated under their own 
control before applying for OPEC.  This would counter any efforts 
by the independent states (e.g., Azerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan) to 
apply separately once Russia had gained acceptance. According to 
Stephen Blank, Russia desires to gain power over the CIS prior to 
entry into OPEC which would give it a "monopolist role as the 
hegemon of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) energy 
economy"110. 
The U.S. has the technology, expertise, and the motive for 
reworking existing fields, finding new ones, and improving 
pipeline infrastructure in the former Soviet Union.  The question 
is:  how much risk is the U.S. willing to take to ensure the 
future economic security of the U.S. and reverse the possibility 
for the "second" demise (or revolution) of the former Soviet 
110Stephen J. Blank, "Energy and Security in Transcaucasia", 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, September 1994, pp. 
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Union. The U.S. had appropriated $2.5 billion in aid to the 
former Soviet Union for fiscal year 1994, but only $1.05 billion 
had been designated for transfer by mid 1994. The funds, of 
which 20 percent was earmarked specifically to the economic 
sector, were divided as follows within the energy sector: $80 
million for energy efficiency - to improve the efficiency and 
extend the privatization of energy production and to increase 
safety at Soviet-style nuclear power plants; and $125 million for 
energy and environmental imports - to provide financing for 
Russian importers of U.S. equipment to improve energy production 
and reduce pollution, especially in gas production.  This is only 
a token of support compared to that which was allocated in the 
late 1980's for agricultural subsidies and Perestroika reform. 
The designated funds are not sufficient for the problem at hand, 
and secondly, why has $1.45 billion been held back with out any 
reference to future allocations? Much of the controversy is 
directly related to the lack of support for FSU aid on Capitol 
Hill by both the ranking Republicans and Democrats111. Most 
lawmakers focus on the lack of reform and the policy proposals 
set forth by Strobe Talbott, architect of the Clinton 
administrations policy toward the former Soviet Union. 
Mismanagement of 1994's $2.5 billion aid package by the Yeltsin 
Administration is also a major concern from both parties. 
lllMHow U.S. Aid to Former Soviet States is Spent", 
Congressional Quarterly, January 29, 1994, pp. 187-188. 
99 
ni . . . ri lio h
orm i t i isc , t lio
ra i . ,
hi t r i h i
t r, er d low it t r:
il o icien icien
io t n
viet- t l l er l t ; il o
o ental ort ina n
ussi port r . . ent r ct
ll t , ci l ucti . i l
o ort par t hi a lo ~
0' ri lt r l si i r st .
t f t e t ,
dl , . i io l it t
o o uc f t r
i t f ort c it l
ill  t  epubli s e ocrats111 . ost
a akers   f or l  osal  
t  t  albo t, it t f li  
inistrat  li  ar   er oviet nion. 
is anage ent f 94's .  i o      eltsi  
dministrati   l  ajor cer  o t  arti s. 
111"Ho  . . i   r er oviet t t s  pent", 
ongre si nal uarterl  ar  9, 94, p. 7- 88. 
Currently, this jeopardizes the 1995 $900 million aid package 
proposal to the former Soviet Union. 
There is no simple answer but the necessity for bipartisan 
support is crucial for the future allocations of indispensable 
U.S. aid to the CIS.  The key concern for many politicians is the 
fact that the Clinton administration has paid too little 
attention to the non-Russian former Soviet republics. The policy 
by the administration has been "Moscow first, Yeltsin right-or- 
wrong approach" as suggested by Mitch McConnell (R-KY), ranking 
Republican on the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations 
Subcommittee112.  This appears to be the attitude taken by a 
majority of the Republicans.  The problem stems from a lack of 
careful delineation of what aid is in the U.S. national interest. 
Once this dilemma is solved, the necessary economic prosperity 
for both the U.S. and the FSU can get off to a future of mutual 
benefits for all parties. 
The role of oil and gas from the former Soviet Union will be 
lost if expedient action is not taken within the next couple of 
years. The U.S. has the resources, technology, capital, and 
transnational oil companies available to lend the support. The 
oil-producing states of the CIS are not in a position to bolster 
their respective energy economies from state or private capital. 
With the continued plummeting of oil and gas export revenues, the 
availability of capital reinvestment is also dwindling.  It is 
112Carrol J. Doherty, "Anger Gives Way to Caution in Debate 
over Russia Aid", Congressional Quarterly, March 5, 1994 p. 556. 
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time for the U.S. to step up and prove its humanitarian efforts 
in the world are not a facade. This can only be achieved through 
the establishment of a world order which places more emphasis on 
interdependency and mutual cooperation. This would also prove to 
Russia that the U.S.'s Cold War efforts of providing genuine 
assistance for humanitarian efforts was not utilized to counter 
communist influence but to provide indiscriminate humanitarian 
assistance to all mankind. 
C.  UNITED STATES' INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL 
Energy consumption in the United States for per capita 
consumption is twice as high as that for any of our industrial 
competitors.  This.explains much when considering why the United 
States currently depends on over 50% of its domestic consumption 
of oil from foreign sources. With the dramatic drop in domestic 
production and the more lax policies for energy conservation 
since the 1970's, it is no surprise that the United States is 
setting itself up for a devastating national security crisis. 
The conventional wisdom of our congressmen, president, and the 
Department of Energy has been naive and self-serving at best. 
The few policies initiated (e.g., Strobe Talbott's policy for 
placing emphasis on Russian energy) by the United States' during 
the Clinton administration have been too few and fail to 
emphasize the implications for our national interest. 
For example, the new strategic plan for the United States' 
energy sector published by the Department of Energy(DOE) fails to 
address the importance of securing energy supplies until new 
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technology can replace oil and gas as a primary source of energy 
with respect to national security113.  The main DOE emphasis for 
national security interests entails preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons, guarding the current nuclear technology, 
reducing the worldwide stockpile of nuclear weapons, and 
enhancing energy technology infrastructure.  These areas of 
interest are all very important, but national security emphasis 
on nuclear weapons is not the only critical area of concern. 
Current dependence on foreign petroleum requires a policy that 
considers supplementary supplies from more than one source.  This 
lack of concern for a more grandiose policy greatly affects the 
future of our foreign policy relevant to petroleum security. 
The National Energy Strategy implemented by the Bush 
administration following the Persian Gulf War was an appropriate 
response to the United States energy dependency.  The problem 
with this strategy was the fact that it addressed critical areas 
such as foreign oil but neglected to implement policies which 
would modify perpetuating practices of importing more oil and gas 
from the Middle East. Between a blatant disregard for 
environmental conservation practices and the inability to foresee 
(and admit) the impending energy dependency status of the United 
States, the leaders of our nation decided to ignore the telltale 
signs until a crisis was at hand.  For the sake of the United 
States' future energy security, crisis management should not be a 
113c 3See U.S. Department of Energy's Strategic Plan for April 
1994, pp. 20-23. 
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common practice as past events will dictate.  Future petroleum 
crises will be much more severe. No one can foresee the possible 
damage to national security but the possibility for economic 
paralysis is extremely plausible. 
D.  IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES' INVESTMENT IN 
RUSSIAN PETROLEUM 
The United States must be willing to take a risk when 
contemplating the position of Russia within the future world 
order. No matter where Russia shifts within the political 
spectrum, it is evident from a historical perspective that Russia 
will be a key player. 
The disorderly policy employed by Moscow to gain control of 
the Russian petroleum sector is ineffective and lacks the 
resources necessary for successful reformation. At this critical 
juncture in U.S./Russian relations, it is time for Washington to 
step up the pressure on Moscow to cooperate with the West with 
respect to economic development. Foreign aid is still a major 
necessity for Russian economic recovery.  It should be the main 
carrot of choice when considering Russian cooperation.  The 
nature of current cooperation places too much emphasis on 
political orientation and the rate of change respective of 
democratic principles of organization. A democratic state is not 
built over night.  The future of Russia is not dependent upon 
whether Russia will become a democratic state, but whether they 
have been offered the financial and personnel aid necessary to 
transform into a democratic state.  The final outcome will depend 
upon which ideology is supported by the major political 
103 
t st t ill i t t . t r oleum
ill uc or r . ssi l
a t l ri t ssibili i
'aral si e l l si l .
. I S I NV STM
S U
nit t t ust il h
t plat si ussi it i orl
er. a t r her ussi i it i lit l
u , i t rom i l r ct t ussi
ill l er.
r l pl os i tr l
ussi roleum t r
ssf l ati . t l
t . . ssi s, im ashi gt
os erat it est it
t i ent. r aj r
essi ussi i er . l ai
r t i  h si r ussi perati .
t r t erat uc phasi
lit l t t
ocrati i l nizati .  ocrati t
ilt r i t. ussi t ent
het er ussi ill ocrati , t het er
n i l el
ransform ocrati . l co ill
hi rt aj r lit l
institutions and the realization of a dire need to reform the old 
practices of waste, coercion, and graft.  The choice will most 
likely depend upon the resources available and the public 
support, provided free elections are still the norm. 
The Russian petroleum sector has a great deal to do with 
economic recovery. As stated prior, foreign capital is the key 
to building infrastructure, expanding modernization, and 
attracting foreign technology.  Since Russia depends on petroleum 
for over 60 percent of its foreign export revenues, reform is 
directly related to these exports. 
The implications for United States' investment in the 
Russian petroleum sector involves many risks but even more 
benefits.  If the United States can help Russia while 
systematically fostering a more stable world order and economic 
security at home, then the choice of involvement within the 
Russian petroleum sector is a question of risk assessment. How 
much risk is the United States willing to take in order to ensure 
economic security and ultimately national security? This 
question implies that it is within the United States' national 
interest to consider such a policy. 
The risks involved with Russian investment include:  (1) the 
possibility of Russia shifting to the nationalist right which 
would involve a situation much similar to the pre-Gorbachev 
Soviet Union; (2) the corruption of foreign aid to be use for 
other than designated purposes; (3) transnational oil companies 
investing in exploration and infrastructure without guaranteed 
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returns; (4) Moscow changing laws which inable them to renege on 
oil contracts and/or passage of presidential decrees which 
discriminate against transnational corporations.  These do not 
encompass all possible risks but pose the more serious dilemmas 
for the governments and transnational corporations willing to 
take that chance. 
Russia is a place where caveat emptor is one of the first 
investment rules. This is primarily due to a complete absence of 
security of title in the legal sense114. The financial 
infrastructure is primitive. Unlike other emerging market 
countries, the custodial system for the registration of stock 
certificates is not in place. There is no central registry of 
shares, therefore, foreign companies must keep their own 
registries.  Several foreign oil companies have encountered this 
problem without the availability to seek retribution for lost 
capital.  The result has been a complete dissolution of 
investment. 
Aside from the risk, U.S.. foreign aid and encouragement of 
transnational oil corporation investment have the potential for 
massive payoffs financially and in terms of national security. 
The most prominent economic agreement to date for the United 
States/Russian cooperation is the 'Partnership for Economic 
Progress' which was signed by President Bill Clinton and 
114Christopher Wood, "Destined to be Rich", Forbes, Volume 
154, Number 8, October 10, 1994, p. 48. 
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President Boris Yeltsin in October, 1994115.  This partnership 
sets out the agenda for greater trade interaction between the two 
countries.  The main emphasis was the removal of major barriers 
to trade and investment. The U.S. decided to immediately 
transfer $100 million in aid funds to directly support trade and 
investment through the U.S. Commerce Department.  This agreement 
is a great step towards mutual cooperation but does not go far 
enough.  The U.S. must be willing to commit the necessary 
capital, technology, and human resources in order to revamp the 
Russian economy to at least simulate a market economy.  The 
initial step will be a commitment respective of the rhetoric from 
the National Energy Policy under the Bush administration. 
This National Energy Policy identified goals of increasing 
oil production outside the Persian Gulf by promoting greater 
involvement of American companies within Russia.  The policy 
stressed the need for transferring Western equipment and 
technology, especially recognizing the expertise of American 
companies in the oil and gas industry.  The Office of Export 
Assistance was established to provide the necessary focus on 
energy related exports.  This office was responsible for working 
closely with the Office of International Affairs, the Departments 
of Energy, State, and Commerce, to coordinate activities within 
the U.S. government to promote exports and ensure that the energy 
industry received the appropriate level of government support. 
115T Richard Seltzer, "U.S. - Russia Summit Spurs Trade and 
Investment", Chemical and Engineering News, Volume 72, Number 40, 
October 3, 1994, p. 7. 
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What has happen to this policy which would directly support the 
U.S. energy sector? Apparently, as mentioned earlier, the 
congressional support seems to have focused on internal energy 
matters instead of the more important energy matters of foreign 
investment and external national security concerns. This focus 
must change if the United States has any plans for exploiting the 
opportunities available in the former Soviet Union. 
The United States has the ways and the means to capitalize 
on the misfortune of the former Soviet Union. This is not a 
decision to exploit the misfortune of others but to benefit from 
economic windfall (Russian petroleum turmoil) for future 
security. The Russian energy prospects will not be a gift served 
to the U.S. on a silver platter, rather with the necessary 
investment and desire to establish a stable and prosperous 
Russian economy, the silver platter may be seen in the future as 
massive dividends from petroleum partnerships, a stable political 
economy within the former Soviet Union, American energy imports 
from more diversified sources, and ultimately a more stable 
supply of cheaper world petroleum in support of the U.S. national 
interest. 
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V.  RUSSIAN ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
A.  BURDENS OF THE PAST AND BUREAUCRATIC LIMITATIONS TO CHANGE 
Throughout the Soviet period, the main impetus of the 
petroleum industry was to be a supporting mechanism for the 
massive military industrial complex. During this era, efficiency 
was displaced for mass petroleum output.  Petroleum output, 
unlike the output of today, was controlled by a command economy 
under strict bureaucratic controls. The introduction of 
privatization after the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union created 
an atmosphere of hope and revitalization for the petroleum 
industry. The major problem, besides the lack of sufficient cash 
flow, has been the political uncertainty which continues to 
preclude true reform. The economic and political stability 
necessary for a prosperous petroleum industry can only be 
achieved through further privatization of the industry. 
This milestone has been partially accomplished despite the 
vacillating efforts of Boris Yeltsin. On April 1, 1995, he 
hesitantly signed a long-awaited decree which would overhaul the 
Russian petroleum industry. This decree calls for the full 
corporate merger of subsidiary companies into Russia's huge oil 
conglomerates (e.g., Lukoil) and mandates the privatization of 
the government-owned oil giant, Roseneft116.  In addition, Yeltsin 
signed another decree in late April, 1995, which removed a major 
116Neela Banerjee, "Oil Industry Overhaul is Ordered by 
Yeltsin, but Questions Remain", The Wall Street Journal, April 4, 
1995, p. 16. 
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hurdle blocking the disbursement of nearly $1.4 billion in 
commercial loans backed by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to Russian 
oil companies.  This decree lifts a requirement that oil 
exporters convert 50 percent of their hard-currency to rubles117. 
In effect, this policy was supposed to boost the value of the 
ruble but never materialized after the demise of the Soviet 
Union. 
As we look into the future, a whole host of problems may 
affect the solvency of Russia's economic turmoil. However, the 
issue should not be placing trust in one political figure such as 
Boris Yeltsin, but rather a more comprehensive approach of 
initiating institutional reform through direct monetary and 
personnel assistance.  By focusing on personalities, we fail to 
see the power center from which real change can be manifested. 
The old Soviet Union clearly possessed a distinct chain of 
command held together by the Communist Party apparatus.  Today, 
the structure which bonded these institutions (e.g., the KGB, 
Armed Forces, military industrial complex, state bureaucracy, 
etc.) has disintegrated.  That which is left of any 
organizational structure is controlled through the bureaucratic 
and traditional way of thinking.  The current power structure in 
Russia is controlled by the successors to the aforementioned 
institutions which have also become more autonomous than before. 
These institutions now enjoy a negative power structure whereby 
117
"Hurdles Removed on Loans to Russian Oil Companies, The 
Wall Street Journal. May 2, 1995, p. 15. 
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their objectives are not clearly delineated through a 
constitutional process which also explains the weak legal system 
and the lack of reform. These institutions do possess enough 
power to dilute, sabotage, and derail the projects of others, but 
not enough power to implement reform thorough legal processes. 
The legacies from empire to include old institutions, old 
elites, and old habits of mind are extremely difficult to root 
out. There are five main areas comprised of the multinational 
structure, the economy, the defense complex, the KGB, and the 
Russian Army, which have created the most extensive problems from 
past experience118.  For this study, I have focused on the economy 
since the petroleum industry is a mirror image of the economic 
market conditions. 
Gorbachev lobbied to save the single economic space during 
the late 1980's, but the interest quickly disintegrated towards 
isolationism and nationalism. The Communist Party and the union 
center were the only political forces resisting disintegration. 
The economy was faltering and the discredit by historical 
experiences to reverse the change was not on their side. The 
result of the disintegration was a complete collapse of the 
Communist regime. The Soviet Union as we know it, ceased to 
exist. The Soviet republics transformed into independent states 
(mostly) , but they could not survive economically without the 
118James Sherr, "Russian Orthodoxies", The National Interest, 
Winter 1992/93, pp. 43-44. 
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others.  The contributions received from the center was now 
nullified. 
The contiguous step for the center (the Moscow bureaucracy) 
was to modify the status quo by introducing economic laws which 
would create a democratic process of electing directors to the 
newly created Council of Labor Collectives (a council responsible 
for economic objectives between all states). These actions 
attempted to produce democratic principles in the economic sphere 
vice the political sphere. Budget restraints completely 
disappeared, consequently, enterprises became largely more 
independent. 
The voluntary .enterprise associations were created as an 
additional link towards economic cooperation.  Most enterprises 
joined in fear of losing cooperative links with various 
governments and institutions. Due to the pressure from the 
republics, Moscow decided to decentralize economic sectors such 
as construction, agriculture, and processing industry.  The union 
government also accepted the idea of regional and republican 
khozraschet (self sufficiency), first promoted by Estonia. 
The period of perestroika stressed accelerated growth and 
institutional and individual discipline.  The growth rate 
increased machine building and many manufactured products. Many 
of the problems from this era stemmed from what Gorbachev 
mentioned in a speech from 17 May 1990, "The problem with the 
Soviet Union is the people's conservative way of thinking, their 
dogmatism . . . changing peoples minds is the most difficult 
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thing.  Perestroika depends on public opinion"119. An anti- 
alcohol campaign during this era was also a hallmark. The 
strategy followed the concept that institutions and people needed 
to be more productive. This could actually be referred to as a 
Leninist approach. Greater openness (Glasnost) was to encourage 
accountability and responsibility with the streamlining of old 
institutions120. 
During perestroika, the leadership stressed the following 
themes: democratization, marketization, modernization and 
integration into the world economy. The environment required for 
such a comprehensive reform would include arms control, regional 
crisis resolution, and increased assistance from the West. 
Democratization was based on the establishment of pluralistic 
government, laws for institutions which were responsive to market 
forces, will of the people, enhanced authority for parliamentary 
institutions, and mobility based on performance. Marketization 
was based on monetary stabilization followed by price reform. 
This would require market reports to measure the criteria for 
economic activity. Markets for capital would be produced along 
with monopoly control. Markets were created for capital, labor, 
and an outlet for goods. The rapid privatization of production 
was a necessity but disregarded for a gradual implementation. 
119Ian Jeffries, Socialist Economies and the Transition to 
the Market, (New York: Routledge Publishing, 1993), p. 39. 
120Reiner Weichhardt, The Central and East European Economies 
in the 1990's:  Prospects and Restraints, (Brussels: NATO 
Economics Directorate and Office of Information and Press, 1990), 
p. 18. 
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Integration into the world economy included expansion of trade, 
opening industry to foreign investment, participation in 
international economic institutions, establishment of meaningful 
exchange rates, and achievement of currency convertibility. 
Modernization included replacement of low productivity 
enterprises with more efficient enterprises with the capacity for 
competition in the world market. This process would also include 
changes in the structure of investment and production (including 
conversion of defense production). 
The Russians declared sovereignty (1990-91) and commenced 
campaigning for a transfer of enterprises under union control 
into its own possession. Under turmoil, the collapse of the 
centralized government was quite evident. Upon the destruction 
of the old system, there appeared no network of market economic 
relations.  Fifteen new independent command systems appeared with 
only partial complimentary market structures.  It was time to 
open the doors to private sector development.  The problem was as 
follows: what would be the avenue for relinquishing authority 
away from the state sector? The state continued to have primary 
control and access to all resources.  The economy was headed 
towards disintegration and anarchy. 
The consequences of this union disintegration included: 
loss of control over wages, accelerated growth of income of 
population, and a drastic fall in production.  The dissolution of 
traditional economic links between the independent states posed 
problems of maintaining existing levels of production. During 
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this time, state investment declined due to a battle against 
mounting financial crisis. Ultimately, the planning system 
collapsed and reform was required in epic proportions. 
The single system consisting of one body of control and 
implementation was now little more than fragments. Each entity 
had lost its prior compatibility with one another. Since the 
disappearance of the center, bilateral agreements on deliveries 
and price control would have to assimilate common regulations. 
Progress was slow and painful. Each state looked towards its own 
interest, and nobody trusted one another. 
The financial system has created the problems of accelerated 
destruction of the economy. The many routes available in 
creating a new cooperative economic system are labeled futile by 
those who destroyed the infrastructure. One critical view of the 
collapse of the communist regime blames the sector leadership for 
total disregard of financial problems.  If these leaders had 
directed more attention to the financial and monetary policies, 
the Soviet Union would probably still exist as a bona fide 
economic institution.  "Softer institutional changes" may have 
preserved the socialist economy of choice.  Since the 
commencement of Perestroika, financial policy of the union 
government had been irresponsible and controlled through 
populism.  Communist control inevitably lost the trust of the 
people. 
The Soviet Union needed a policy which granted independence 
and privatization of state enterprises along with price 
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liberalization and budget constraints. Apparently, 
liberalization of personal incomes was initiated as a substitute 
for a bona fide taxation system.  Consequently, state 
expenditures and state budget deficits grew out of control.  The 
deficit was accepted by the union, but revenues were re- 
distributed to republic and local governments. Due to the 
unsuccessful reconstruction of the banking system and credit 
policy, total control of money (capital) supply was lost. The 
budget deficit was financed from the GOSBANK, which in turn, took 
credit away from the rest of the deteriorating economy.  In 1991, 
the union and republic governments deteriorated due to the 
struggle for budget reform. 
The ruble was immediately devalued from the loss of 
financial stability and caused a direct fall in production. The 
separate budgets of fifteen states operated with lack of 
agreement and endangered those stabilization policies already 
implemented by the Russian government. 
A very costly mistake made during perestroika was in the 
area of external economic and exchange rate policy. A principle 
referred to as "foreign exchange self-financing" was utilized to 
commercialize the state enterprises on the way towards 
privatization.  Self-financing referred to the foreign exchange 
allowed to remain within the state.  The states whose economies 
were largely dependent on imports were required to earn foreign 
exchange. The states that primarily exported products were much 
better off financially.  The flaws of this policy could have been 
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corrected if the enterprises were forced to buy foreign exchange 
at the current market rate, just as the case in western 
capitalist states121. 
The decline in production negatively impacted the oil and 
gas industry (major export items) which was the most important 
source of hard currency revenue. The western nations ceased to 
observe Russia (CIS) as a reliable debtor. Most enterprises 
avoided export taxes by leaving their earned exchange in western 
bank accounts or conducting only barter deals. The rules of the 
game changed and now the only strategy was survival. 
The Russian Federation continues to create change in their 
economy. With the assistance from the G-7 nations, reform will 
hopefully take the initial steps towards a market economy. 
Currently, a lack of international trade has stagnated the 
economy.  The changes need to develop vigorously and with careful 
consideration of the long term consequences. 
The fifteen newly independent states presently have observed 
sharp declines in interstate trade and trade with the rest of the 
world.  International requirements for hard currency are 
financial burdens among the states. The drop in trade volume 
causes a decrease in production and decline of incomes.  The 
effects of negative trade has multiplicative results to numerous 
internal trade mechanisms. The access to new markets is 
essential for survival in the market economy. 
121Weichhardt, pp. 18-30. 
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International exports have decreased fifty percent in the 
last two years.  Government controls on exports (licensing, 
quotas, taxes, surrender of foreign exchange at less than market 
prices) discourages most states to export.  This has led to 
"illegal" exports and trans-shipments of raw materials and oil by 
"under invoicing" exports and by "over invoicing" imports.  The 
market rate of foreign exchange is low relative to purchasing 
power. This provides increased protection against hard currency 
imports. 
Inflation and loss of control within the ruble zone force 
most states to pay for imports with rubles of declining value. 
Central banks within the ruble zone have extended credit on 
exports to enterprises, but the credit was cut at specified 
limits in order to control the flow of goods between states. The 
flow of imports of energy and raw material from Russia into the 
independent states has created a situation of dependence. Most 
states are attempting to avoid this situation due to past 
experience.  Once export restraints are reduced and the ruble 
zone defined, the economy should be able to internationalize 
trade and increase imports and exports. 
Price liberalization is currently a problem for a majority 
of products.  Energy and raw materials are priced well below the 
world market level.  These products are under very tight export 
control between world markets and states within the ruble area. 
Bilateral trade agreements have greatly increased and still 
possess many features found in programs from the old central 
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planning government. The use of price control and product 
deliveries also fall under this system. 
The Russian Federation is gradually moving trade 
transactions toward market prices. This causes many problems for 
those states which import much of their energy sources. Energy 
and fuel was a cheap trade commodity while the Soviet Union was 
still a nation state. The only countries who stand to gain in 
fuel and raw material are the exporters from Russia, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaidzhan122. 
The market economy within the Russian Federation will most 
likely produce bankruptcy for many enterprises. Many economists 
assert that this process is necessary in order to derogue those 
industries not capable of withstanding reform. Most of these 
enterprises were extremely weak prior to the conversion process. 
Some weak enterprises will flourish (as producers), if the tax 
burden is decreased, and the strong enterprises incorporate the 
weak ones into the fragile economy. The production process in 
real commercial goods must increase exponentially before the 
trade process can flourish.  This is why the economy needs to 
push the producer to the forefront of the economy. 
The banking system is currently hindered by inflation.  Some 
loan rates are as high as 200%. With these type of rates, 
bankruptcy will be widespread, and the banks will own the 
122Constantine Michalopoulos, "Trade Issues in the New 
Independent States" in Studies of Economies in Transformation, 
Washington D.C., 1993 by The World Bank (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1993) p. 3. 
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enterprises before long.  The banks do not have the business 
experience to operate the industries; thus, the disintegration of 
the economy would repeat once again. 
The situation in the Russian Federation for the year of 1995 
(projected by the Russian Ministry of Finance) shows the budget 
deficit to reach 10.5 percent of GDP.  Inflation will average 7 
to 9 percent per month. The market exchange rate is 7000-8000 
rubles to the dollar.  The decline in industrial production 
should reach no more than 6 percent and 3.80 percent for agra- 
industrial production123. The situation is still waning, but the 
adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution which created the 
preconditions for the continuation and development of economic 
reform is continuing to create headway. 
The Russian Federation is concentrating efforts on pursuing 
a moderately tough monetary-credit policy, continuing the process 
of privatization, implementing a package of measures to provide 
the population with social support, broadening the autonomy of 
the regions, carrying out institutional transformations, 
developing relations with the CIS member states, and further 
liberalizing foreign economic activity. However, various 
important tasks in the socioeconomic sphere have not been 
accomplished to include:  decline in industrial and agricultural 
production, stoppages at enterprises, continued financial crisis, 
marked drop in investment activity, the preservation of an 
123
"The Path of Economic Development", FBIS - Central 
Eurasia, Moscow, March 24, 1995, p. 4. 
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irrational national economic structure, and a noticeable drop in 
the standard of living for most people. The government is 
concerned with problems linked with the untimely payment of 
wages, deterioration in enterprise's solvency, the continuing 
high level of inflation, and the increase in crime. The Russian 
Ministry of Finance acting jointly with the Central Bank of 
Russia is currently working on a plan to draw spare cash from 
corporate entities, corporate banks and the population, for the 
investment in the production of goods and services. The Russian 
Federation is also establishing numerous laws and regulations to 
ensure the adequacy and implementation of necessary sector flows 
of economic reform. The government currently accepts the need 
for expedient reform and the enforcement of regulation. 
Russia must keep close economic links between each of the 
CIS states for possible future success. Economic prevalence will 
only be achieved after the needs of the economy, needs of the 
people, and the creation of new jobs is integrated within all 
aspects of the Russian economy. The CIS is currently not 
productive in the international market. The only exception is 
energy and raw materials which is limited to specified states. 
In order to preserve the single economic space, all the former 
republics need to open up markets through one another and create 
an unified export base. This will also require the abolition of 
many explicit and implicit export restraints. 
The factors which have contributed to the economic decline 
of the fifteen new independent states are paramount.  The 
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following approaches should ensure the restoration of trade 
relations with each other and integrate their economies with the 
broader international economy.  The former Soviet states should 
adhere to some of the recommendations suggested by Constantine 
Michalopoulos (World Bank): 
(1)  Phase out price controls,  related export 
restraints,  and import subsidies;   (2)   strengthen 
competitive forces by terminating state trading, 
promote entry of private firms,   and encourage 
enterprise-to-enterprise trade;   (3)  improve 
institutional infrastructure in support of trade 
relative to domestic and international payments system; (4)  increase intergovernmental cooperation on trade and 
payments issues;   (5)  international community should 
provide technical assistance and policy advice for CIS 
trade internationally;   (6)  international community 
should improve access for exports by reducing their 
trade barriers on imports of manufactures and 
agricultural products124. 
The obstructions to free markets within Russia correspond 
directly to the "old" Soviet bureaucracy which is attempting to 
dismantle the old command structures. When local bureaucrats 
obstruct rather than assist in the process of economic reform, 
the center responds by strengthening the power of the center as 
was the case during the Soviet era.  Currently, there exists 
conditions of anarchy unlike the Soviet-style centralization. 
Where ministries have disintegrated, local legislative bodies 
have rushed in to issue decrees, export licenses, and the 
registration and authorization documents entitling enterprises to 
124Constantine Michalopoulos, "Trade Issues in the New 
Independent States" in Studies of Economies in Transformation, 
Washington, D.C., 1993, by the World Bank (Washington, D.C.:  The 
World Bank, 1993), p. 3 
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be "in business"125. The result is an extremely corrupt corporate 
system. With a corresponding (and in kind) response from the 
center to issue decrees (by Yeltsin), the result is likewise a 
corrupt political agenda (e.g., excessive export controls in 
order to limit capital flight). 
The petroleum sector is no different, perhaps even more 
corrupt due to the massive funds at stake. The petroleum 
enterprises pay virtually no taxes. They are treated as "pet 
projects" by the Yeltsin Administration unlike the other private 
industries which must over-compensate from "the lack of petroleum 
taxes" (quite the opposite as noted earlier for the joint 
ventures) . As can be inferred from the forthcoming examples, 
capitalism under Russian terms bolsters individual enrichment 
through a process of quid pro quo.  If the oil and gas industry 
was treated like other private industries (e.g., taxes and legal 
code), it could contribute about 10 percent of Russia's gross 
domestic product or up to $30 billion in tax revenues. A prime 
example of corrupt behavior in the petroleum sector is the 
practice of keeping oil and gas prices artificially low within 
the FSU (e.g., December 1994 domestic price was 25 percent of the 
world market price)126. This practice was initially enacted in 
order to offset high transport costs and keep industrial 
125
 James Sherr, "Russian Orthodoxies", The National 
Interest, Winter 1992/93, p. 44. 
126Anders Aslund, "How Russia Became A Market Economy", 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1995, p. 
13. 
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production costs under control.  Additionally, inadequate export 
controls allow oil executives to sell oil on their personal 
account abroad. They are able to buy the oil at home for four 
times less than the world price, then turn about and sell it 
abroad at the global level. The interests of the petroleum 
industry are well protected but unfortunately it is at the cost 
of real reform.  These inexcusable acts of self preservation can 
only mean the continued disintegration of the state. Prolonged 
corruption within Russia's energy sector will threaten democracy 
and stability without conciliatory action by the Yeltsin 
Administration.  This action must come in the form of legal 
reform, political cooperation, will power, and ultimately 
pragmatic assistance from the West. 
B.  RUSSIAN ECONOMIC SECURITY AND WESTERN AID 
The lack of real and substantial aid to Russia from the West 
had been much less significant during the Soviet era than since 
the demise of Soviet Union in August, 1991. The most irrational 
response of Western governments to the economic and political 
transformation in Russia and the rest of the FSU has been their 
unwillingness to make any major commitment.  The United States 
and Germany headed two international meetings in 1992 to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the FSU. This form of aid at the time 
did not appear appropriate since there existed no humanitarian 
emergency in the entire FSU.  Humanitarian aid was most likely 
substituted for real structural assistance and systemic change 
which would promote macroeconomic stabilization.  This aid was 
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promoted most likely due to the fact that humanitarian aid is 
cheap and generates good publicity.  It is evident from their 
response that Western governments did not take the Russian 
attempt at economic transformation seriously. 
To put this in a historical perspective, the Western 
behavior at this time is reminiscent of the period after World 
War I. There was no single nation which took initiative and 
international responsibility for the consequences of the future 
viability of the international community. Each nation was more 
interested in its exclusive national interest without the 
necessary consideration of whether the stability of the 
international community was still a significant concern. With 
respect to the Soviet demise, the pragmatic and idealistic views 
from the days of the Marshall Plan are completely absent. Take 
for example during the apex of the Marshall Plan (1948-49), U.S. 
donations totaled 2.10 percent of U.S. GDP; for 1995, the U.S. 
budget request for aid to the whole FSU amounts to 0.01 percent 
of GDP127. The differential is quite apparent and substantial. 
We can speculate in view of the U.S. perspective that the 
rebuilding of Europe after World War II was much more important 
than the restructuring of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the rest of 
the states of the FSU, after the end of the Cold War.  This does 
not say much for the Western politicians' vision for the future 
of the international community. 
127Aslund, pp. 216-220. 
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Why was the West (and specifically the U.S.) lax in its 
response to such a landmark event of the fall of the Soviet 
empire? It is understandable that the West would proceed with 
extreme caution, but isolating the Western alliance against the 
possibility of influencing the political and economic 
liberalization of the Russian states was not much more than a 
remote consideration. No one in the West displayed appropriate 
international leadership. Therefore, the IMF, which was tasked 
with the disbursement and allocation of various funds to the FSU, 
gained more prominence in the post-Soviet transition than it had 
the capacity for.  It can be suggested from these events that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was not dramatic enough for the 
world community to realize that a fundamental postwar crisis 
would ensue in the aftermath. The current isolation of the 
Russian state can be attributed to the inappropriate response by 
the West of treating the Russian Federation as a rogue state 
instead of one of the most powerful military and political states 
in the world.  In essence, Russia must be strong enough to endure 
the lack of international political support and set its sights on 
the private international sector which can prove to be the most 
crucial asset to a prosperous future Russian state. 
The West is having a difficult time trying to determine 
whether Russia will be a partner or emerge again as a rival. 
This is one of the major dilemmas which has precluded the 
expansion of aid and investment in the Russian revolutionary 
transformation.  Would a decrease of Western involvement create a 
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self-fulfilling prophecy by making negative assessments about 
their future? Russia has managed very well to cast off the old 
communist system on its way towards democracy and capitalism. 
The question still remains whether the West is willing to commit 
enormous resources in order to influence the course of history 
for Russia in the twenty-first century. 
With all prior Western responses set aside, Russia and the 
world desire a successful transformation of the FSU into bona 
fide democratic states. Foreign investment must occur at a much 
more rapid pace in order to promote stability in a current state 
of confusion. Russia must ensure an investment climate conducive 
to foreign investment. This is especially true within the 
petroleum sector because it is the primary driving force able to 
kindle economic growth. As mentioned earlier, President Boris 
Yeltsin has incorporated many investment incentives into the 
Russian emerging market, but the political and economic 
uncertainty still prevents many prospective investors from taking 
the initial risk.  So far, Russia has failed to bridge the gap on 
basic business principles which are fundamental to mutual 
success.  It is imperative that Western investors and Russian 
public and private business representatives seek a common 
understanding through seminars and other information exchange 
programs128. 
128Constantine S. Nicandros, "Russian Oil, Western 
Investment", Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
England, July 1, 1993, p. 756. 
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It is quite apparent at this time that the large Western oil 
conglomerates view Russia and the FSU as one of the greatest 
potential oil and gas regions in the world.  Take for instance 
the gamble by Exxon Corp., Mitsubishi Corp., and China's state 
oil company, to contemplate a partnership to build a $12 billion, 
4900 mile natural gas pipeline from the former Soviet republic of 
Turkmenistan, on the Caspian Sea, to the Pacific Ocean outlet in 
China. This proposed partnership would tap the large petroleum 
deposits in the Caspian129. With such a partnership, the Russian 
Federation would be bypassed for any passage rights and/or 
royalty payments.  The following proposal may seem unrealistic, 
but in view of the current Russian restrictions on most petroleum 
extracted within the confines of the former Soviet Union and 
transported across its territory, the possibility for the 
execution of this proposal suggests the desperate attempts by 
foreign oil companies to bypass Moscow for an expedient share in 
the FSU petroleum trade. Money appears not to be a concern when 
the risk can be divided into smaller portions and even greater 
returns. 
The barriers imposed by the political actors (and including 
culturally inherent barriers) pose serious risks to the future 
survival of the Russian economy.  There is a lack of clear 
delineation of responsibility among Russian decision-makers which 
makes it very hard to make progress in negotiations.  There is no 
129 c Steve Levine, "Exxon Eyes Big Gamble", San Jose Mercury 
News, September 9, 1995, p. 1A. 
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defined tax code, and multitudes of taxes are being invented by- 
different entities, which if actually imposed would exceed total 
revenues. Another barrier is the wide chasm in cultures. 
Russians and Westerners are taught to think in different ways and 
uphold different value systems. There does not appear to be any 
common understanding when in it comes to business dealings130. 
Mutual trust as in the past is in short supply. The answer lies 
somewhere in the process of mutual and shared risks between the 
private and public sectors, and the increased utilization of 
common business protocol. 
There appears to be three main barriers which obstruct the 
acceleration of international investment momentum.  They are as 
follows:  (1) a lack of a common frame of reference (e.g., the 
concepts of profit, return on investment, cost efficiency, and a 
common business vocabulary); (2) the tendency to spread resources 
too thin (this includes most of the Western aid promised to 
Russia which has the potential to be spread too thin and have no 
realistic effect); and (3) the lack of adequate risk sharing 
mechanisms (Russia desires the financial burden be placed on the 
transnational petroleum companies). 
The priority must be to focus on these three areas and 
finding ways around them. The only way to approach these 
setbacks is by learning to work together. Western petroleum 
companies need to find expertise within the Russian workforce and 
130Constantine S. Nicandros, "Russian Oil, Western 
Investment", Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
England, July 1, 1993, p. 756. 
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complement this with their own.  Conoco and various other 
petroleum companies have attempted to confront these problems by 
joining forces with Russian research institutes and by creating a 
data base of all the organizations in the FSU that can provide 
goods and services for the petroleum industry131.  This measure 
alone will not solve the unique problems at hand, but it is a 
significant start towards finding a common ground. 
Unique circumstances and unique risks associated with the 
failure of reform in Russia justify some extraordinary effort. 
This effort will not be attainable unless both Russia and the 
West are willing to make concessions in order to incorporate the 
business culture of both sides.  In the end though, Russia is the 
only player that can replace the present disarray in the 
legislative and tax codes with rational and efficient structures. 
The onus will ultimately fall upon the Russian Federation and its 
future cadre of political leaders.  The transformation of Russia 
into a future economic power and reliable trading partner will be 
difficult if not daunting, but it will prevail if everyone works 
together with an esprit de corps, a common purpose, and sheer 
determination. 
131Nicandros,  pp. 756-757. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Soviet Union had been many things to many people to 
include ethnic groups, leaders, military personnel and 
adversaries. That state has ceased to exist as a political and 
economic entity. Today, the dawning of a new era for this region 
is at an early stage where political and economic trends have not 
yet been established.  Preliminary indications as suggested in 
this thesis point to major economic changes which statistically 
appear hopeful but still influenced through political corruption 
from the Soviet era. The parliamentary elections this fall 
(1995) and the presidential election of 1996 will most likely 
determine the direction of Russia in the near future. This 
decision will ultimately be determined by the political elite's 
ability or inability to fulfill the needs of an impatient public. 
The petroleum industry in relation to economic prosperity 
should be quite apparent from the emphasis placed upon the 
industry from both Russia and foreign petroleum corporations. 
The question of whether confidence-building measures necessary 
for continued economic opportunity have been introduced by the 
Yeltsin administration is still not apparent. Much of the 
evidence presented in this thesis suggests that there is still 
considerable risk that the economy could go awry again, but such 
a pessimistic outlook can only lead to further isolation of the 
Russian Federation from the rest of the world.  States which 
comprise the G-7 (who have the most clout in worldly affairs) 
must ensure this does not happen due to the dire consequences of 
131 
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an unstable and isolated Russian state. Western complacency has 
already done serious damage to this region (e.g., lack of 
financial aid and personnel assistance in the privatization 
process), but the consequences are not irreversible if expedient 
action is taken in the very near future. 
The facts presented within this thesis emphasize the 
significance of the Russian petroleum industry both within the 
FSU and its implications for the world and particularly the 
United States. Conclusions can be drawn from these facts that 
include the following:  there is a slim possibility of Russia 
solving the inadequacy of its petroleum industry without Western 
assistance; political instability will continue to deteriorate 
without legal and constitutional reform; political instability 
will create economic turmoil and ultimately further deterioration 
of the petroleum industry; the prospects for newly discovered 
petroleum deposits appear promising provided necessary capital is 
available for extraction and pipeline construction; and finally, 
Russia must be willing to work in cooperation with the other 
independent states in order to secure a successful commonwealth. 
In order to put this all in perspective and explain the 
significance of the role of the Russian petroleum industry, we 
must contemplate a recent development where Russia lined up 
collateral stock to secure new loans. The Russian government has 
listed twenty-nine companies in which state-owned shares will be 
used as collateral to secure loans to the federal government.  At 
the top of this list, oil giants Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegas, 
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and oil trader Nafta Moskva, compose a majority of the intended 
stock transfer. A presidential decree signed on August 31, 1995, 
allows the government to turn over its holdings in the companies 
to lenders in return for loans.  Certain restrictions will apply- 
to the oil companies' shares sold to foreign investors. These 
stipulations have not been determined, but the decree also states 
that once the loans are paid off, the investors will sell the 
shares and receive an undisclosed commission from the Russian 
government. The Yeltsin administration hopes to raise at least 
3.00 trillion rubles ($672 million) from this process for the 
Russian budget in 1996. This money will be utilized to meet the 
target budget of 8.70 trillion rubles for the privatization 
process and economic revitalization. This appears to be a 
positive step for the Russian economy, for the Russian petroleum 
industry, and for Western investors to get a foothold within the 
Russian petroleum industry132. 
In order for Russia to attract the necessary foreign 
investment, more energy roundtables must be held (similar to the 
one held in July 1993 mentioned earlier) between foreign 
investors, Western governments, the Russian government, and the 
governments of the oil-producing states of the former Soviet 
Union. The major obstacles (e.g., tax codes, royalties, 
pipelines, capital investment, etc.) must be addressed in a forum 
with equal representation and a mutually-agreed upon agenda. 
132
"Russia Lines Up Collateral Stock to Secure Loans", The 
Wall Street Journal. September 26, 1995, p. A-19. 
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Initially, there must be a comprehensive legal framework covering 
the broad array of private business activity.  This can only be 
accomplished after compromises have been made by all sides. This 
process will be similar to the negotiations accomplished by the 
U.S. during the NAFTA discussions.  Stability must be a 
prerequisite within the large Russian industries and corporations 
(especially the petroleum industry) in order to facilitate 
stability within the entire economy. 
The cloak of stability within Russia will entice those 
transnational companies formerly intimidated by political and 
economic uncertainty.  Stability is by no means the answer to 
success for Western investment, but it is one of the initial 
building blocks for expanded investment and the cornerstone of 
confidence-building measures. The petroleum industry as 
indicated throughout this thesis is the pathway from which hard 
currency can be earned and invested within the economy and should 
eventually equalize the diversity of wealth and income found 
between exporting industries and those industries which produce 
exclusively for the internal markets. 
Ultimately, the petroleum industry and the Russian economy 
must work in tandem to overcome the various political and social 
barriers placed upon them by the residual effects of the Soviet 
system. Many of these problems are created by the reluctance of 
the various political actors to adopt real structural change for 
fear of the uncertain consequences.  Fear of the unknown will 
more than likely leave the former Soviet Union in a "muddling 
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through" phase of perceived reform, unless the structural changes 
as discussed in this thesis are institutionally incorporated 
within a legal framework and accepted by the business community 
as common practice.  The Russian petroleum industry will have the 
potential to tremendously influence the world petroleum market 
provided this industry is perceived by the political elite of 
Moscow as an indispensable asset for the world market and the 
future of Russian economic stability. 
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